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Abstract—Despite the clear need for specifying and enforcing
information flow policies, existing tools and theories either fall
short of practical languages, fail to encompass the declassification
needed for practical requirements, or fail to provide provable
guarantees. In this paper we make progress on provable guaran-
tees encompassing declassification by leveraging type abstraction.
We translate information flow policies, with declassification, into
an interface for which an unmodified standard typechecker
can be applied to a source program—if it typechecks, the
program provably satisfies the policy. Our proof reduces security
to the mathematical foundation of data abstraction, Reynolds’
abstraction theorem. By proving this result for a large fragment
of pure ML, we give evidence for the potential to build sound
security tools using off the shelf language tools and their theories.
I. INTRODUCTION
A longstanding challenge is the enforcement of information
flow (IF) policy in software systems and applications im-
plemented in conventional general-purpose programming lan-
guages. For high assurance, precise mathematical definitions
are needed for policies, enforcement mechanism, and program
semantics. The latter, in particular, is a major challenge for
languages in practical use. In order to minimize the cost
of assurance, especially over time as systems evolve, it is
desirable to leverage work on formal modeling with other
goals such as functional verification, equivalence checking,
and compilation.
To be auditable by stakeholders, policy should be expressed
in an accessible way. This is one of several reasons why
types play an important role in many works on IF. For
example, Flowcaml [1] and Jif [2] express policy using types
that include IF labels. They statically enforce policy using
dedicated IF type checking and inference. Techniques from
type theory are also used in security proofs such as those for
Flowcaml and the calculus DCC [3].
IF is typically formalized as the preservation of indistin-
guishability relations between executions. Researchers have
noticed that this should be an instance of a celebrated seman-
tics basis in type theory: relational parametricity [4]. Relational
parametricity provides an effective basis for formal reasoning
about program transformations [5], representation indepen-
dence and information hiding for program verification [6],
[7]. The connection between IF and relation parametricity has
recently been made precise, for DCC, by translation to the
calculus Fω and use of the existing parametricity theorem for
Fω [8].
In this work, we advance the state of the art in the connec-
tion between IF and relational parametricity, guided by three
main goals. One of the goals motivating our work is to reduce
the burden of defining dedicated type checking, inference, and
security proofs for high assurance in programming languages.
A promising approach towards this goal is the idea of leverag-
ing type abstraction to enforce policy, and in particular, lever-
aging the parametricity theorem in programming languages
to obtain security guarantees. A concomitant goal is to do so
for practical policies that encompass selective downgrading,
which is needed for the vast majority of policies of practical
interest. Without downgrading, a password checker program or
a program that calculates aggregate or statistical information
must be considered insecure, for example.
To build on the type system and formal theory of a language
without a priori IF features, policy needs to be encoded
somehow, and the program may need to be transformed. For
example, to prove that a typechecked DCC term is secure
with respect to the policy expressed by its type, Bowman and
Ahmed [8] encode the typechecking judgment by nontrivial
translation of both types and terms into types and terms of Fω.
Any translation becomes part of the assurance argument. Most
likely, complicated translation will also make it more difficult
to use extant type checking/inference (and other development
tools) in diagnosing security errors and developing secure
code. This leads us to highlight a third goal, needed to achieve
the first goal, namely to minimize the complexity of translation.
There is a major impediment to leveraging type abstraction:
few languages are relationally parametric or have parametricity
theorems! The lack of parametricity can be addressed by
focusing on well behaved subsets and leveraging additional
features like ownership types that may be available for other
purposes (e.g., in the Rust language). As for the paucity of
parametricity theorems, we take hope in the recent advances
in machine-checked metatheory, such as correctness of the
CakeML and CompCert compilers, the VST logic for C, the
relational logic of Iris. For parametricity specifically, the most
relevant work is Crary’s formal proof of parametricity for the
ML module calculus [9]. Our main result is a reduction of IF
to parametricity in that calculus.
Before elaborating on our contributions let us review some
prior work. The calculus DCC expresses policy using monad
types indexed on levels in a lattice of security levels with
the usual interpretation that flows are only allowed between
levels in accord with the ordering. While DCC is a theoret-
ical calculus, its monadic types fit nicely with the monads
and monad transformers used by the Haskell language for
computational effects like state and I/O. Algehed and Russo
encode the typing judgment of DCC in Haskell using closed
type families, one of the type system extensions supported
by GHC [10]. However, they do not prove security; and DCC
expresses strict noninterference, with no form of downgrading.
Bowman and Ahmed translate DCC to Fω and prove the
security theorem of DCC as a consequence of parametricity of
Fω [8]. (The original security proof for DCC does not leverage
parametricity [3].) DCC relies on a subsidiary judgment about
types, called “protected-at”, and the cited works rely on the
power of a highly expressive target calculus to encode this
judgment. As we discuss in the related work section II, prior
attempts to formalize security of DCC using parametricity in
less powerful target calculi encountered difficulties in connec-
tion with the “protected-at” judgment. Most information flow
type systems address practical policies in which the sensitive
data is first order; they express and check security more simply
than DCC. Our goals do not at all necessitate a system like
DCC for policy.
Cruz et al [11] consider policies in which downgrading is
expressed in terms of allowed declassifier programs, encoding
the “relaxed noninterference” idea of Li and Zdancewic [12]
using type abstraction in the object calculus. The formulation
of policy in terms of allowed operations is attractive and seems
adaptable to practical languages. The idea is close to the use of
an explicit “declass” operation as in Jif and other works, while
keeping policy distinct from program rather than embedded
in it. Although the object calculus enjoys a parametricity
theorem [13], the security proof of Cruz et al is done from
scratch. Moreover they make a significant modification to the
type system, introducing faceted types in order to express
sensitivity from the perspective of observers at different levels.
This makes good use of subtyping, already present in the
object calculus, but is a concern with respect to our goals
of leveraging existing tools and theorems.
Our first contribution is to translate policies with declassifi-
cation (in the style of relaxed interference) into abstract types
in a functional language, in such a way that typechecking the
original program implies its security. We consider variations
in which a thin wrapper is used, but we do not rely on
on a specialized security type system like DCC. A program
that typechecks may use the secret inputs parametrically, e.g.,
storing in data structures, but cannot look at the data until
declassification has been applied. Our second contribution is to
prove security by direct application of a parametricity theorem.
We carry out this development twice: for polymorphic lambda
calculus, using the original theorem of Reynolds, and for
the ML module calculus using Crary’s theorem. The second
handles a large fragment of a real language while the first
serves to expose the ideas. The technical details for ML are far
too complicated to present in a conference paper, but complete
details are presented in appendices.
The ML result makes a strong connection with a large
fragment of a “real” language, however, we fall short of our
practical goals because our development does not account for
programs with high (or multiple level) computation and output.
Although this is needed in general, there are many important
programs where this does not matter such as data mining
computations using sensitive inputs to calculate aggregate
or statistical information, and many mobile apps. To solve
this problem we could follow Cruz et al and introduce a
notion of faceted types for ML, but this would undercut the
goal of leveraging existing tools. Instead we offer our third
contribution, which is simply to pose this open problem:
encode relaxed policies using type abstraction, encompassing
multiple level computation and outputs while leveraging an
existing parametricity theorem—or demonstrate that it cannot
be done. For practical relevance, the encoding should target a
language like ML with efficient type checking.
Outline: Section II describes related work and Section III
introduces security policies for relaxed noninterference. Sec-
tion IV recapitulates the abstraction theorem in the context
of the simply typed and call-by-value lambda calculus, close
to that of Reynolds [4], so we can expose the main ideas
in a simple setting. Section V presents our first result: type-
based encoding of policy, and proof of relaxed noninterfer-
ence for this calculus by means of the abstraction theorem.
Section VI discusses extensions of the first result for more
expressive policies and more permissive checking.1 Although
many variations and extensions are possible, in this article we
devote the available space to working out the chosen versions
in detail. Section VII describes our result that uses the calculus
and abstraction theorem of Crary [9], which formalizes the
functional core of standard ML and its module system. It
supports unrestricted recursion at the term level, generative
and applicative functors, higher-order functors, sealing, and
translucent signatures. For this calculus we have carried out
a development parallel to that in Section V, which can be
found in full detail in appendices. In Section VII we sketch the
ideas using SML code. Section VIII concludes by highlighting
limitations of our encodings and challenges for future work.
All results not proved in the paper are proved in appendices.
II. RELATED WORK
We focus on the closest related work regarding noninter-
ference, declassification, and connections to the abstraction
theorem. We refer the interested reader to [14] for the early
history of language-based information flow security, and to
[15] for a survey on declassification up to 2009.
a) Typing secure information flow: Pottier and Si-
monet [16] implement FlowCaml [1], the first type system
for information flow analysis dealing with a real-sized pro-
gramming language (a large fragment of OCaml), and they
prove soundness. In comparison with our results, we do not
consider any imperative features; they do not consider any
form of declassification, their type system significantly departs
from standard ML typing rules, and their security proof is not
1Noninterference is undecidable so we do not expect a type system to allow
all secure programs.
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based on an abstraction theorem. An interesting question is
whether their type system can be translated to system F or
some other calculus with an abstraction theorem. FlowCaml
provides type inference for security types. In this work, we rely
on the standard ML type system to enforce security. Standard
ML provides type inference, which endows our approach
with an inference mechanism. Our work has a significant
limitation compared with FlowCaml and other systems: as
noted in Section I, our encoding does not allow computation
that produces both secret and public outputs.
Barthe et al. [17] propose a modular method to reuse type
systems and proofs for noninterference for declassification.
They also provide a method to conclude declassification
soundness by using an existing theorem. In contrast to our
work, their type system significantly departs from standard
typing rules, and does not make use of abstraction.
Tse and Zdancewic [18] propose a security-typed language
for robust declassification: declassification cannot be triggered
unless there is a digital certificate to assert the proper authority.
Their language inherits many features from System F<: and
uses monadic labels as in DCC [3]. In contrast to our work,
security labels are based on the Decentralized Label Model
(DLM) [19], and are not semantically unified with the standard
safety types of the language.
Compared with type systems, relational logics can specify
IF policy and prove more programs secure through semantic
reasoning [20]–[23], but at the cost of more user guidance and
less familiar notations.
b) Relaxed Noninterference: As discussed in the intro-
duction, our policies and security property are based on the
work of Li and Zdancewic [12], which proposes two kinds
of declassification policies: local and global policies. Our
approach supports both of them. Their source programs are
written in a pure lambda calculus with recursion, like the
language we consider in Sections IV and V except that we do
not include recursion until Section C. Sabelfeld and Sands [15]
evaluate the formalization of [12] with respect to guiding
principles for declassification.
c) Connections between secure information flow and
type abstraction: The Dependency Core Calculus (DCC) [3]
expresses security policies using monadic types. It does not
include declassification, and the noninterference theorem of [3]
is proved from scratch. Tse and Zdancewic [24] translate the
recursion-free fragment of DCC to System F. The main theo-
rem for this translation aims to show that parametricity of Sys-
tem F implies noninterference. Shikuma and Igarashi identify
a mistake in the proof [25]; they also give a noninterference-
preserving translation for a version of DCC to the simply-
typed lambda calculus. Although they make direct use of
a specific logical relation, their results are not obtained by
instantiating a general parametricity theorem. Bowman and
Ahmed [8] finally provide a translation from the recursion-
free fragment of DCC to System Fω, successfully proving
that parametricity implies noninterference, via a correctness
theorem for the translation (which is akin to a full abstraction
property). Bowman and Ahmed’s translation makes essential
use of the power of System Fω to encode judgments of DCC,
raising the question whether a simpler target type system can
suffice for security policies expressed differently from DCC.
These works are “translating noninterference to parametric-
ity” in the sense of translating both programs and types. The
practical implication is that one might leverage an existing
type checker by translating both a program and its security
policy into another program such that it’s typability implies
the original conforms to policy. Our work aims to cater more
directly for practical application, by avoiding (or minimizing)
the need to translate the program and hence avoiding the need
to prove the correctness of a translation. This approach seems
to have limitations—in particular, concerning computation that
produces both public and secret outputs—which we pose as
an open problem. Of course in a sufficiently powerful type
system, one can express the security property semantically.
But then typechecking is undecidable and the translation does
not serve our goals.
Cruz et al. [11] show that type abstraction implies relaxed
noninterference. Similar to ours, their definition of relaxed
noninterference is a standard extensional semantics, using
partial equivalence relations. This is in contrast with [12]
where the semantics is entangled with typability. They allow
computation on secrets and require that the result of such
computation cannot be released. In contrast to our work, their
results are in the context of the object calculus [13] where they
use subtyping to guide the security levels order. They do not
attempt to use the abstraction theorem of the object calculus
to conclude soundness. We conjecture that our approach can
also be applied in the context of the object calculus for relaxed
noninterference as defined in [11]. We leave this as future
work.
Protzenko et al. [26] propose to use abstract types as the
types for secrets and use standard type systems for security.
This is very close in spirit to our work. Their soundness
theorem is about a property called “secret independence”, very
close to noninterference. In contrast to our work, there are no
results for any kind of declassification and no attempt to use
the abstraction theorem.
Rajani and Garg [27] connect fine- and coarse-grained type
systems for information flow in a lambda calculus with general
references, defining noninterference (without declassification)
as a step-indexed Kripke logical relation that expresses indis-
tinguishability. Further afield, a connection between security
and parametricity is made by Devriese et al [28], featuring a
negative result: System F cannot be compiled to the the Sumii-
Pierce calculus of dynamic sealing [29] (an idealized model
of a cryptographic mechanism). Finally, information flow
analyses have also been put at the service of parametricity:
Washburn and Weirich [30] generalize parametricity in the
presence of runtime type analysis using security labels for
data structures that should remain confidential in order to hide
implementation details .
d) Abstraction theorems for other languages: Vytiniotis
and Weirich [31] prove the abstraction theorem for Rω, which
extends Fω with constructs that are useful for programming
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with type equivalence propositions. Rossberg et al [32] show
another path to parametricity for ML modules, by translating
them to another calculus, System Fω . Crary’s result [9] covers
a large fragment of ML but not references and mutable state.
Banerjee and Naumann [7] prove an abstraction theorem for
a sequential Java-like language, using a form of ownership
types to enforce abstraction for dynamically allocated mutable
objects, and in later work they prove similar results using
program annotations to enforce abstraction [33], [34]. (Around
the same time, they proved noninterference for a security type
system for a similar language, but from scratch rather than via
an abstraction theorem [35], [36].) Ahmed et al. [37] develop
a step-indexed logical relation for a language with references.
Based on that work, Dreyer et al. [38] formulate a relational
modal logic for proving contextual equivalence for the LADR
language that has general recursive types and general ML-style
references atop System F. Timany et al [39] give a logical
relation for a state monad and use it to prove contextual
equivalences. These works are important steps towards the
development of abstraction theorems for rich fragments of
practical languages.
III. DECLASSIFICATION: LOCAL POLICIES
The main idea in relaxed noninterference security policies
is to specify for each confidential input how it can be re-
leased [12]. Inspired by this idea, our security policies, called
local policies, map confidential inputs to a declassification
function f , or a combination of an action a and a declas-
sification function f (see §VI for a generalization). When a
confidential input x can be declassified via the combination
of an action a and a function f , then the result of f(a x)
is allowed to be made visible to a public observer. In other
words, the confidential input can be declassified via f ◦ a,
where (f ◦ a)(x) = f(a x). The result of a x is not visible
to the observer, only f(a x) is. The input can be manipulated
parametrically until a is applied, and then the result of a x
can be manipulated parametrically until f is applied. Thus the
policy is applied to the original input, as usually advised to
avoid laundering attacks [15].
The syntax for writing declassification functions and actions
is as below,2 where n is an integer value, and ⊕ represents
primitive arithmetic operators.
τ ::= int | τ → τ Types
e ::= λx : τ.e | e e | x | n | e⊕ e Terms
a, b ::= λx : int.e Actions
f, g ::= λx : int.e Declass. Functions
The static semantics and the dynamic semantics for the
policy language are standard and similar to the ones of the
simply typed and call-by-value lambda calculus with type
variables (see § IV). For primitive operators, to simplify the
2In this paper, the type of confidential inputs is int. We choose this since we
are sticking with [12]. The result presented in this paper can be generalized
to accept confidential inputs of arbitrary types.
presentation, we suppose that the applications of operators
on well-typed arguments always terminates. Therefore, the
evaluations of declassification functions and combinations on
values always terminate.
For policies we refrain from using concrete syntax and
instead give a simple formalization that facilitates later def-
initions.
Definition III.1 (Local Policy). A local policy P is a tuple
〈VP ,FP〉, where VP is a finite set of variables for confiden-
tial inputs, and FP is a partial mapping from variables in VP
to declassification functions or combinations.
For simplicity we require that if a or f appears in the policy
then they are closed terms, a is of the type int→ int, and f
has type int→ τf for some τf .
In the definition of local policies, if a confidential input is
not associated with a declassification function or a combina-
tion, then it cannot be declassified. Formally, a combination
is mathematically defined as a pair 〈f, a〉 but we write it as
f ◦ a for clarity.
Example III.2 (Policy POE using f ). Consider policy POE
given by 〈VPOE ,FPOE〉 where VPOE = {x} and FPOE(x) =
f = λx : int.xmod 2. Policy POE states that only the parity
of the confidential input x can be released to a public observer.
Example III.3 (Policy PH using f ◦ a). (inspired by [12,
Example 3.2.1]) Assume that hash is a primitive operator.
Consider policy PH given by 〈VPH ,FPH〉 where VPH = {x},
FPH(x) = f ◦ a, a is λx : int.hash x, and f is λx :
int.x mod 264. Policy PH states that the hashed value of the
confidential input x cannot be released, but the lowest 64 bits
of its hashed value can.
The notion of action can be generalized to multiple steps
of declassification, for example to specify the correct order of
application of sanitizers [40]. Our encoding can be extended
straightforwardly to multiple steps, at the cost of notational
clutter we prefer to avoid in this presentation.
IV. ABSTRACTION THEOREM
For source programs we choose the simply typed and call-
by-value lambda calculus, with integers and type variables,
because of two reasons: (1) the chosen language is similar
to the language used in the paper of Reynolds [4] where
the abstraction theorem was first proven, and (2) we want to
illustrate our encoding approach (§V) in a minimal calculus.
This section defines the syntax and semantics and presents
key results that culminate in the abstraction theorem, a.k.a.
parametricity. These results are basically standard. In fact our
language is very close to the one in Reynolds [4, § 2], for
which we prove the abstraction theorem using contemporary
notation3.
3 Some readers may find it helpful to consult references such as these
for background on logical relations and parametricity: [41, Chapt. 49], [6,
Chapt. 8], [42], [43].
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A. Language
The syntax of the language is as below, where α denotes
a type variable, x a term variable, and n an integer value. A
value is closed when there is no free term variable in it. A
type is closed when there is no type variable in it.
τ ::= int | α | τ1 × τ2 | τ1 → τ2 Types
v ::= n | 〈v, v〉 | λx : τ.e Values
e ::= x | v | 〈e, e〉 | πie | e1e2 Terms
E ::= [.] | 〈E, e〉 | 〈v, E〉 | πiE | E e | v E Eval. Contexts
We consider terms without type variables as source programs
(the role of type variables is to encode policies, as explained in
due course). We use small-step semantics, with the reduction
relation _ defined inductively by these rules.
πi〈v1, v2〉 _ vi (λx : τ.e)v _ e[x 7→ v]
e _ e′
E[e] _ E[e′]
We write e[x 7→ e′] for capture-avoiding substitution of
e′ for free occurrences of x in e. Here and throughout, we
use parentheses to disambiguate term structure. As usual, _∗
denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of _.
a) Typing rules: A typing context ∆ is a set of type
variables. A term context Γ is a mapping from term variables
to types.
We write ∆ ⊢ τ to mean that τ is well-formed w.r.t. ∆.
The definition of ∆ ⊢ τ is described below. The definition is
standard and it amounts to the requirement that type variables
in τ are in ∆. We say that e is typable w.r.t. ∆ and Γ (denoted
by ∆,Γ ⊢ e) when there exists a well-formed type τ s.t.
∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ .
∆ ⊢ int ∆, α ⊢ α
∆ ⊢ τ1 ∆ ⊢ τ2
∆ ⊢ τ1 × τ2
∆ ⊢ τ1 ∆ ⊢ τ2
∆ ⊢ τ1 → τ2
The derivable typing judgments are defined inductively in
Fig. 1. The rules are to be instantiated only with Γ that is
well-formed under ∆, in the sense that ∆ ⊢ Γ(x) for all
x ∈ dom(Γ). When the term context and the type context
are empty, we write ⊢ e : τ .
B. Logical relation
A logical relation is a type-indexed family of relations on
values, based on given relations for type variables. From it is
derived a relation on terms. The abstraction theorem says the
latter is reflexive.
FT-INT
∆,Γ ⊢ n : int
FT-VAR
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆,Γ ⊢ x : τ
FT-PAIR
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ∆,Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ1 × τ2
FT-PRJ
∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ1 × τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ πie : τi
FT-FUN
∆,Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ e : τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ λx : τ1.e : τ1 → τ2
FT-APP
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ∆,Γ ⊢ e2 : τ1
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ2
Fig. 1. Typing rules
Let γ be a term substitution, i.e., a finite map from term
variables to closed values, and δ be a type substitution, i.e., a
finite map from type variables to closed types. In symbols:
γ ::=. | γ, x 7→ v Term Substitutions
δ ::=. | δ, α 7→ τ, where ⊢ τ Type Substitutions
We say γ respects Γ (denoted by γ |= Γ) when dom(γ) =
dom(Γ) and ⊢ γ(x) : Γ(x) for any x. We say δ respects ∆
(denoted by δ |= ∆) when dom(δ) = ∆. Let Rel(τ1, τ2) be
the set of all binary relations over closed values of closed
types τ1 and τ2. Let ρ be an environment, a mapping from
type variables to relations R ∈ Rel(τ1, τ2). We write ρ ∈
Rel(δ1, δ2) to say that ρ is compatible with δ1, δ2 as follows:
ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2) , dom(ρ) = dom(δ1) = dom(δ2) ∧ ∀α ∈
dom(ρ).ρ(α) ∈ Rel(δ1(α), δ2(α)). The logical relation is
inductively defined in Fig. 2, where ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2) for some
δ1 and δ2. For any τ , [[τ ]]ρ is a relation on closed values. In
addition, [[τ ]]evρ is a relation on terms.
Lemma IV.1. Suppose that ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2) for some δ1 and
δ2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows that:
• if 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ, then ⊢ vi : δi(τ), and
• if 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρ , then ⊢ ei : δi(τ).
We write δ(Γ) to mean a term substitution obtained from Γ
by applying δ on the range of Γ, i.e.:
dom(δ(Γ)) = dom(Γ) and ∀x ∈ dom(Γ) : δ(Γ)(x) = δ(Γ(x)).
Suppose that ∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ , δ |= ∆, and γ |= δ(Γ). Then
we write δγ(e) to mean the application of δ and γ to e. For
example, suppose that δ(α) = int, γ(x) = n for some n, and
α, x : α ⊢ λy : α.x : α → α, then δγ(λy : α.x) = λy : int.n.
We write 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[Γ]]ρ for some ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2) when
γ1 |= δ1(Γ), γ2 |= δ2(Γ), and 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[Γ(x)]]ρ for
all x ∈ dom(Γ).
Definition IV.2 (Logical equivalence). Terms e and e′ are
logically equivalent at τ in∆ and Γ (written∆,Γ ⊢ e ∼ e′ : τ )
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FR-INT
〈n, n〉 ∈ [[int]]ρ
FR-PAIR
〈v1, v
′
1〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ 〈v2, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ
〈〈v1, v2〉, 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρ
FR-FUN
∀〈v′1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ.〈v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρ
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρ
FR-VAR
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ R∈ Rel(τ1, τ2)
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[α]]ρ[α7→R]
FR-TERM
⊢ e1 : δ1(τ) ⊢ e2 : δ2(τ)
e1 _
∗ v1 e2 _
∗ v2 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ
〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρ
Fig. 2. Logical relation
if ∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ , ∆,Γ ⊢ e′ : τ , and for all δ1, δ2 |= ∆,
all ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2), and all 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[Γ]]ρ, we have
〈δ1γ1(e), δ2γ2(e′)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρ .
Theorem IV.3 (Abstraction [4]). If ∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ , then ∆,Γ ⊢
e ∼ e : τ .
V. TYPE-BASED RELAXED NONINTERFERENCE
In this section, we show how to encode security policies
as standard types in the language of § IV, we define and we
prove our first free theorem. The security property is called
typed-based relaxed noninterference (TRNI) and is taken from
Cruz et al [11].
Through this section, we consider a fixed policy P (see
Def. III.1) given by 〈VP ,FP〉. We treat free variables in a
program as inputs and, without loss of generality, we assume
that there are two kinds of inputs: integer values, which are
considered as confidential, and declassification functions and
actions, which are fixed according to policy. A public input
can be encoded as a confidential input that can be declassified
via the identity function.
A. Views and indistinguishability
In order to define TRNI we define two term contexts, called
the confidential view and public view. The first view represents
an observer that can access to all confidential inputs, while
the second one represents an observer that can only observe
declassified inputs. The views are defined using fresh term and
type variables.
a) Confidential view: Let V⊤ = {x | x ∈ VP \
dom(FP)} be the set of inputs that cannot be declassified.
First we define the encoding for these inputs as a term context:
ΓPC,⊤ , {x : int | x ∈ V⊤}.
Next, we specify the encoding of confidential inputs that can
be declassified. To this end, define 〈〈 , 〉〉C as follows, where
a : int→ int and f : int→ τf are in P .
〈〈x, f〉〉C , {x : int, xf : int→ τf}
〈〈x, f ◦ a〉〉C , {x : int, xa : int→ int, xf : int→ τf}
Finally, we write ΓPC for the term context encoding the
confidential view for P .
ΓPC , Γ
P
C,⊤ ∪
⋃
x∈dom(FP)
〈〈x,FP (x)〉〉C .
We assume that, for any x, the variables xf and xa in the
result of 〈〈x,FP (x)〉〉C are distinct from the variables in VP ,
distinct from each other, and distinct from xf ′ and xa′ for
distinct f ′, a′. We also make this assumption in the definition
of the public view, to follow.
From the construction, ΓPC is a mapping, and for any x ∈
dom(ΓPC), it follows that Γ
P
C(x) is a closed type. Therefore,
ΓPC is well-formed for the empty set of type variables, so it
can be used in typing judgments of the form ΓPC ⊢ e : τ .
Example V.1 (Confidential view). For POE described in
Example III.2, the confidential view is: ΓPOEC = x : int, xf :
int→ int. For PH described in Example III.3, the confidential
view is ΓPHC = x : int, xa : int→ int, xf : int→ int.
b) Public view: The basic idea is to encode local policies
by using type variables. First we define the encoding for
confidential inputs that cannot be declassified. We define a set
of type variables, ∆PP,⊤ and a mapping Γ
P
P,⊤ for confidential
inputs that cannot be declassified.
∆PP,⊤ , {αx | x ∈ V⊤} Γ
P
P,⊤ , {x : αx | x ∈ V⊤}
This serves to give the program access to x at an opaque type.
In order to define the encoding for confidential inputs that
can be declassified, we define 〈〈 , 〉〉P :
〈〈x, f〉〉P , 〈{αf}, {x : αf , xf : αf → τf}〉
〈〈x, f ◦ a〉〉P , 〈{αf◦a, αf}, {x : αf◦a, xa : αf◦a → αf ,
xf : αf → τf}〉
The first form will serve to give the program access to x only
via function variable xf that we will ensure is interpreted as
the policy function f ; similarly for the second form. We define
a type context ∆PP and term context Γ
P
P that comprise the
public view, as follows.
〈∆PP ,Γ
P
P 〉 , 〈∆
P
P,⊤,Γ
P
P,⊤〉 ∪
⋃
x∈dom(FP)
〈〈x,FP (x)〉〉P ,
where 〈S1, S
′
1〉 ∪ 〈S2, S
′
2〉 = 〈S1 ∪ S2, S
′
1 ∪ S
′
2〉.
Example V.2 (Public view). For POE, the typing context in the
public view has only one type variable: ∆POEP = αf . The term
context in the public view is ΓPOEP = x : αf , xf : αf → int.
For PH, the typing context in the public view has two type
variables: ∆PHP = αf◦a, αf . The term context in the public
view is ΓPHP = x : αf◦a, xa : αf◦a → αa, xf : αf → int.
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From the construction, ΓPP is a mapping, and for any x ∈
dom(ΓPP ), it follows that Γ
P
P (x) is well-formed in ∆
P
P (i.e.
∆PP ⊢ Γ
P
P (x)). Thus, Γ
P
P is well-formed in the typing context
∆PP . Therefore, ∆
P
P and Γ
P
P can be used in typing judgments
of the form ∆PP ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ .
Notice that in the public view of a policy, types of variables
for confidential inputs are not int. Thus, the public view does
not allow programs where concrete declassifiers are applied
to confidential input variables even when the applications are
correct according to the policy (e.g. for POE, the program f x
does not typecheck in the public view). However, the public
view does allow programs where confidential input variables
are used in applications of declassifier variables associated
with them (e.g. for POE, the program xf x is well-typed in
the public view).
c) Indistinguishability: The security property TRNI is
defined in a usual way, using partial equivalence relations
called indistinguishability. To define indistinguishability, we
define a type substitution δP such that δP |= ∆PP , as follows:
for all αx, αf , αf◦a in ∆
P
P ,
let δP(αx) = δP(αf ) = δP(αf◦a) = int. (1)
The inductive definition of indistinguishability for a policy
P is presented in Figure 3, where αx, αf , and αf◦a are from
∆PP . Indistinguishability is defined for τ s.t. ∆
P
P ,Γ
P
P ⊢ τ .
The definitions of indistinguishability for int and τ1 × τ2
are straightforward. We say that two functions are indistin-
guishable at τ1 → τ2 if on any indistinguishable inputs they
generate indistinguishable outputs. Since we use αx to encode
confidential integer values that cannot be declassified, any
integer values v1 and v2 are indistinguishable, according to
rule Eq-Var1. Notice that δP(αx) = int. Since we use αf to
encode confidential integer values that can be declassified via
f where ⊢ f : int→ τf , we say that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]] when
〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ IE [[τf ]]. The idea behind IV [[αf◦a]] is similar.
We write e1 =int e2 to mean that e1 _
∗ v and e2 _
∗ v for
some integer value v.
Indistinguishability is illustrated in Example V.3.
Example V.3 (Indistinguishability). For POE (of Exam-
ple III.2), two values v1 and v2 are indistinguishable at αf
when both of them are even numbers or odd numbers.
IV [[αf ]] = {〈v1, v2〉 | ⊢ v1 : int,⊢ v2 : int,
(v1 mod 2) =int (v2 mod 2)}.
For PH (of Example III.3), two values v1 and v2 are
indistinguishable at αf◦a when they are integer values and
the lowest 64 bits of their hashed values are the same.
IV [[αf◦a]] = {〈v1, v2〉 | ⊢ v1 : int,⊢ v2 : int,
((hash v1)mod 2
64) =int ((hash v2)mod 2
64)}.
We say that two term substitutions γ1 and γ2 are indis-
tinguishable w.r.t. P (denoted by 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]]) if the
following conditions hold.
EQ-INT
〈n, n〉 ∈ IV [[int]]
EQ-PAIR
〈v1, v
′
1〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]] 〈v2, v
′
2〉 ∈ IV [[τ2]]
〈〈v1, v2〉, 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 × τ2]]
EQ-FUN
∀〈v′1, v
′
2〉 : 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]].〈v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ IE [[τ2]]
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 → τ2]]
EQ-VAR1
⊢ v1, v2 : δP(αx)
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αx]]
EQ-VAR2
⊢ v1, v2 : δP(αf ) 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ IE [[τf ]]
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]]
EQ-VAR3
⊢ v1, v2 : δP(αf◦a) 〈a v1, a v2〉 ∈ IE [[αf ]]
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf◦a]]
EQ-TERM
⊢ e1, e2 : δP(τ)
e1 _
∗ v1 e2 _
∗ v2 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ ]]
〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]
Fig. 3. Indistinguishability
• γ1 |= δP(ΓPP ) and γ2 |= δP(Γ
P
P ),
• for all xf ∈ dom(ΓPP ), γ1(xf ) = γ2(xf ) = f ,
• for all xa ∈ dom(ΓPP ) , γ1(xa) = γ2(xa) = a,
• for all other x ∈ dom(ΓPP ), 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[Γ
P
P (x)]].
Note that each γi maps xf and xa to the specific functions
f and a in the policy. Input variables are mapped to indistin-
guishable values.
We now define type-based relaxed noninterference w.r.t. P
for a type τ well-formed in ∆PP . It says that indistinguishable
inputs lead to indistinguishable results.
Definition V.4. A term e is TRNI(P , τ) provided that ΓPC ⊢ e,
and ∆PP ⊢ τ , and for all 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]] we have
〈γ1(e), γ2(e)〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]].
Notice that if a term is well-typed in the public view then
by replacing all type variables in it with int, we get a term
which is also well-typed in the confidential view (that is, if
∆PP ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ , then Γ
P
C ⊢ δ(e) : δ(τ) where δ maps all
type variables in ∆PP to int). However, Definition V.4 also
requires that the term e is itself well-typed in the confidential
view. This ensures that the definition is applied, as intended,
to programs that do not contain type variables.
The definition of TRNI is indexed by a type for the result
of the term. The type can be interpreted as constraining the
observations to be made by the public observer. We are mainly
interested in concrete output types, which express that the
observer can do whatever they like and has full knowledge of
the result. Put differently, TRNI for an abstract type expresses
security under the assumption that the observer is somehow
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forced to respect the abstraction. For example, we consider
the policy POE (of Example III.2) where x can be declassified
via f = λx : int.x mod 2. As described in Example V.2,
∆POEP = αf and Γ
POE
P = x : αf , xf : αf → int. We have that
the program x is TRNI(POE, αf ) since the observer cannot
do anything to x except for applying f to x which is allowed
by the policy. This program, however, is not TRNI(POE, int)
since the observer can apply any function of the type int→ τ ′
(for some closed τ ′), including the identity function, to x and
hence can get the value of x.
Example V.5. The program xf x is TRNI(POE, int). Indeed,
for any arbitrary 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]], we have that γ1(xf ) =
γ2(xf ) = f = λx : int.x mod 2, and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]],
where γ1(x) = v1 and γ2(x) = v2 for some v1 and v2.
When we apply γ1 and γ2 to the program, we get respec-
tively v1 mod 2 and v2 mod 2. Since 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]], as
described in Example V.3, (v1 mod 2) =int (v2 mod 2). Thus,
〈γ1(xf x), γ2(xf x)〉 ∈ IE [[int]]. Therefore, the program xf x
satisfies the definition of TRNI.
Remark V.6 (On definition of TRNI). The definition of
TRNI(P , τ) does not require that e is well-typed in the public
view or the type of e in the public view is τ . Thus, we have
cases where e is TRNI(P , τ) and e is not well-typed in the
public view or the type of e in the public view and τ are
different. In fact, in such cases, the type of e in the confidential
view and τ will be compatible in the sense that if we replace
all type variables in τ with int, we get the type of e in the
confidential view.
Here is an example of a program that is TRNI at int but it
is not well-typed in the public view: e = (λx : int.xmod 2) x.
We can easily verify that program e is TRNI(POE, int). This
program is not well-typed in the public view since in the public
view, the type of x is not int. Notice that this example also
shows that our type system is not complete, as it must be for
reasons of decidability (see also Section VI-A.b).
We now give an example of a program that is TRNI at
τ but its type in the public view is not τ . We consider a
policy P• where VP• = {x} and FP•(x) = f = λx : int.x
(i.e. x can be declassified via the identity function). We
have that x is TRNI(P•, int). Indeed, since f is the identity
function, we have that IV [[αf ]] = {〈v, v〉 | ⊢ v : int}.
Thus, for any γ1 and γ2 s.t. 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P•]], we have
that γ1(x) = γ2(x) and hence 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[int]]. The
program x is TRNI(P•, int), but the type of x in the public
view is αf .
B. Free theorem: typing in the public view implies security
In order to prove the free theorem, we define ρP as follows:
• for all αx ∈ ∆PP , ρP(αx) = IV [[αx]],
• for all αf ∈ ∆PP , ρP(αf ) = IV [[αf ]],
• for all αf◦a ∈ ∆PP , ρP(αf◦a) = IV [[αf◦a]].
It is a relation on the type substitution δP defined in Eqn. (1).
Lemma V.7. ρP ∈ Rel(δP , δP).
From Lemma V.7, we can write [[τ ]]ρP or [[τ ]]
ev
ρP
for any
τ such that ∆PP ⊢ τ . We next establish the relation between
[[τ ]]evρ and IE [[τ ]]: under the interpretation corresponding to
the desired policy P , they are equivalent. In other words,
indistinguishability is an instantiation of the logical relation.
Lemma V.8. For any τ such that ∆PP ⊢ τ , we have
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρP iff 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ ]], and also 〈e1, e2〉 ∈
[[τ ]]evρP iff 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]].
By analyzing the type of ΓPP (x), we can establish the
relation of γ1 and γ2 when 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]].
Lemma V.9. If 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]], then 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[ΓPP ]]ρP .
The main result of this section is that a term is TRNI at τ
if it has type τ in the public view that encodes the policy.
Theorem V.10. If e has no type variables and∆PP ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ ,
then e is TRNI(P , τ).
Proof. From the abstraction theorem (Theorem IV.3), for
all δ1, δ2 |= ∆PP , for all 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[Γ
P
P ]]ρ, and for all
ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2), it follows that
〈δ1γ1(e), δ2γ2(e)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρ .
Consider 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]]. Since 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]], from
Lemma V.9, we have that 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[ΓPP ]]ρP . Thus, we have
that 〈δPγ1(e), δPγ2(e)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρP . Since e has no type variable,
we have that δPγi(e) = γi(e). Therefore, 〈γ1(e), γ2(e)〉 ∈
[[τ ]]evρP . Since 〈γ1(e), γ2(e)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρP
, from Lemma V.8, it
follows that 〈γ1(e), γ2(e)〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]. In addition, since e
has no type variable and ∆PP ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ , we have that
δP(Γ
P
P ) ⊢ e : δP(τ) and hence, Γ
P
C ⊢ e. Therefore, e is
TRNI(P , τ).
Example V.11 (Typing implies TRNI). We consider the policy
POE. As described in Example V.1 and Example V.2, the
confidential view ΓPOEC is x : int, xf : int and the public
view ∆POEP ,Γ
POE
P is αf , x : αf , xf : αf → int. We look at
the program xf x. We can easily verify that Γ
POE
C ⊢ xf x : int
and ∆POEP ,Γ
POE
P ⊢ xf x : int. Therefore, by Theorem V.10, the
program is TRNI(POE, int).
Similarly, we have that the program xf (xa x) is well-typed
in both views of PH, and in the public view, its types is int.
Thus, the program is TRNI(PH, int).
Example V.12. In this example, we illustrate that if a program
is well-typed in the confidential view and is not TRNI(P , τ)
for some τ well-formed in the public view of P , then the type
of the program in the public view is not τ or the program is
not well-typed in the public view.
We consider the policy POE. As described in Example V.11,
its public view is αf , x : αf , xf : αf → int. We first look at
the program x. This program is not TRNI(POE, int) since x
itself is confidential and cannot be directly declassified. In the
public view of the policy, the type of this program is αf which
is not int.
We now look at the program x mod 3. This program is
not TRNI(POE, αf ) since it takes indistinguishable inputs at
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αf (e.g. 2 and 4) and produces results that may not be
indistinguishable at αf (e.g. 2 = 2 mod 3, 1 = 4 mod 3,
and 〈2, 1〉 6∈ IV [[αf ]]). We can easily verify that this program
is not well-typed in the public view since the type of x in the
public view is αf , while mod expects arguments of the int
type.
VI. EXTENSIONS
A. Local policies
Variations of our encoding can support richer policies and
accept more secure programs. We consider two ways to extend
our encoding.
a) More declassification functions or combinations: The
notation in [12] labels an input with a set of declassification
functions and combinations, so in general an input can be
declassified in more than one way. To show how this can be
accomodated, we present an extension for a policy P where
VP = {x}, and x can be declassified via f ◦ a or g ◦ b for
some f , a, g and b, where ⊢ f : int→ τf and ⊢ g : int→ τg.
The confidential view and the public view for this policy are
as below:
ΓPC = x : int, xa : int→ int, xb : int→ int,
xf : int→ τf , xg : int→ τg
∆PP = αf◦a,g◦b, αf , αg
ΓPP = x :αf◦a,g◦b, xa :αf◦a,g◦b → αf , xb :αf◦a,g◦b → αg,
xf :αf → τf , xg :αg → τg
We now have a new definition of indistinguishability. The
definition is similar to the one presented in §V, except that
we add a new rule for αf◦a,g◦b.
EQ-VAR4
⊢ v1, v2 : int
〈a v1, a v2〉 ∈ IE [[αf ]] 〈b v1, b v2〉 ∈ IE [[αg]]
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αf◦a,g◦b]]
With the new encoding and the new definition of indistin-
guishability, we can define TRNI(P , τ) as in Definition V.4.
From the abstraction theorem, we again obtain that for any
program e, if ΓPC ⊢ e, and ∆
P
P ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ , then e is
TRNI(P , τ).
For example, we consider programs e1 = xf (xa x) and
e2 = xg(xb x). These two programs are well-typed in both
views of P , and in the public view, their types are respectively
τf and τg . Thus, e1 is TRNI(P , τf ), and e2 is TRNI(P , τg).
b) Using an equivalent function to declassify: In most
type systems for declassification, the declassifier function
or expression must be identical to the one in the policy.
Indeed, policy is typically expressed by writing a “declas-
sify” annotation on the expression [15]. However, the type
system presented in [12, § 5] is more permissive: it accepts
a declassification if it is semantically equivalent to the policy
function, according to a given syntactically defined approxi-
mation of equivalence. Verification tools can go even further
in reasoning with semantic equivalence [20], [22], but any
automated checker is limited due to undecidability of semantic
equivalence.
We consider a policy P where there are two confidential
inputs x and y, x can be declassified via f , and y can be
declassified via g, f : int→ τ , and g : int→ τ for some τ .
Suppose that there exists an action a s.t. f◦a = g semantically.
With the encoding in §V, we accept g y, or rather xg y, but
we cannot accept xf (xa y) even though it is semantically the
same. To allow both, we have devised an encoding similar
to the extension described above for policies with multiple
declassifiers, where y is viewed as a confidential input that
can be declassified via g or f ◦ a.
B. Global policies
We now consider policies where a declassifier can involve
more than one confidential input. To be consistent with [12],
we call such policies global policies. For simplicity, in this
subsection, we consider a policy P where there are two
confidential inputs, x1 and x2, which can be declassified via
f of the type int1 × int2 → τf 4. Notice that here we use
subscripts for the input type of f to mean that the confidential
input xi is corresponding to i-th element of an input of f .
Example VI.1 (Average can be declassified). We consider the
policy PAve where there are two confidential inputs x1 and x2
and their average can be declassified. That is x1 and x2 can
be declassified via f = λx : int× int.(π1x+ π2x)/2.
In our encoding, we need to maintain the correspondence
between inputs and arguments of the declassifier since we want
to prevent laundering attacks [15]. A laundering attack occurs,
for example, when the declassifier f is applied to 〈x1, x1〉,
since then the value of x1 is leaked.
In the general case, to encode the requirement that a specific
n-tuple of confidential inputs can be declassified via f , we
introduce a new variable y. The basic idea is that y is
corresponding to that n-tuple of confidential inputs, xi cannot
be declassified, and only y can be declassified via f . Therefore,
the confidential and public views are as below, where for
readability we show the case n = 2.
ΓPC , {x1 : int, x2 : int, y : int× int, yf : int× int→ τf}
∆PP , {αx1 , αx2 , αf}
ΓPP , {x1 : αx1 , x2 : αx2 , y : αf , yf : αf → τf}
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, since xi cannot be declassified,
the indisinguishability for αxi is the same as the one for
αx described in Fig. 3. Since y corresponds to the tuple
of confidential inputs and only it can be declassified via f ,
indistinguishability for the type of y in the public view αf is
as below (again, case n = 2).
EQ-VAR5
⊢ v, v′ : int× int 〈f v, f v′〉 ∈ IE [[τf ]]
〈v, v′〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]]
4We can extend the encoding presented in this section to have policies
where different subsets of VP can be declassified and to have more than one
declassifier associated with a set of confidential inputs.
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We next encode the correspondence between inputs and
argument of the declassifier. We say that a term substitution γ
is consistent w.r.t. ΓPP if γ |= δP(Γ
P
P ) and in addition, for all
i ∈ {1, 2}, πi(γ(y)) = γ(xi). As we can see, the additional
condition takes care of the correspondence of inputs and the
arguments of the intended declassifier.
We next define the type substitution and indistinguishable
term substitutions for P . We say that δP |= ∆PP when
δP(αf ) = int×int and for all αxi , δP(αxi) = int. We say that
two term substitutions γ1 and γ2 are indistinguishable w.r.t. P
(denoted by 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]]) if γ1 and γ2 are consistent
w.r.t. ΓPP , γ1(yf ) = γ2(yf ) = f , for all other x ∈ dom(Γ
P
P ),
〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[ΓPP (x)]].
Then we can define TRNI(P , τ) as in Def. V.4 (except
that we use the new definition of indistinguishable term
substitutions). We also have the free theorem stating that if
e has no type variable and ∆PP ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ , then e is
TRNI(P , τ). The proof goes through without changes.
Example VI.2 (Average can be declassified - cont.). Here
we present the encoding for the policy PAve described in
Example VI.1. The confidential and public views for this
policy is as below:
ΓPAveC , {x1 : int, x2 : int, y : int × int, yf : int × int→ int}
∆PAveP , {αx1, αx2 , αf}
ΓPAveP , {x1 : αx1 , x2 : αx2 , y : αf , yf : αf → int}
We can easily check that the program yf y is
TRNI(PAve, int); it is well-typed in both views, and in the
public view its type is int.
VII. TRNI FOR MODULE CALCULUS
This section recapitulates the development of §V but using
an encoding suited to the module calculus. Our module
calculus is the same as that of Crary [9] except that we
add int for integers. The calculus covers a large fragment
of ML with modules, signatures, type constructors, kinds,
recursion, higher-order functors, and sealing [44]. Crary’s
calculus, needed to prove our theorems, is very involved and
we omit it in the body of the paper (syntax, static semantics,
dynamic semantics can be found in appendix): instead we
decide to present our encoding by examples in ML. Our
security proof relies on Crary’s abstraction theorem for terms.5
The statement of Crary’s abstraction theorem is simple and is
similar to the statement of Theorem IV.3, i.e. a well-typed
term e is related to itself by the defined logical relation.
(The logical relation and abstraction theorem for terms of the
module calculus can be found in appendix.)
We present the idea of the encoding for the module calculus.
(Formalization of the encoding can be found in appendix.) To
make the presentation easier to follow, in this section, we write
examples in standard ML (SML). These examples are checked
with SML of New Jersey, version v110.85 [45].
5In [9], the abstraction theorem is proven not only for terms but also for
module expressions. Terms and modules are interdependent.
For a policy P , we construct the public view and the confi-
dential view by using signatures containing type information
of confidential inputs and their associated declassifiers. In par-
ticular, the signature for the confidential view is a transparent
signature which exposes the type information of confidential
input, while the signature for the public view is an opaque
one which hides the type information of confidential inputs.
For example, for the policy POE (see Example III.2), we have
the following signatures, where transOE and opaqOE are
respectively the transparent signature for the confidential view
and the opaque signature for the public view.
signature transOE =
sig
type t = int
val x:t1
val f:t1->int
end
signature opaqOE =
sig
type t
val x:t1
val f:t1->int
end
Note that different from §V, a program has only a module
input which is of the transparent signature and contains all
confidential inputs and their declassifiers. A program can use
the input via the module variable m. For example, for POE,
we have the program m.f m.x, which is corresponding to
the program xf x in Example V.5.
As in §V, we define indistinguishability as an instantation
of the logical relation, and we say that a term e is TRNI(P , τ)
if on indistinguishable substitutions w.r.t. P , it generates in-
distinguishable outputs at τ . By using the abstraction theorem
for terms, we have the following free theorem.
Theorem VII.1 (Free theorem). If the type of e in the public
view is τ , then e is TRNI(P , τ).
For the module calculus, when e is well-typed in the public
view, e is also well-typed in the confidential view. Therefore,
different from Theorem V.10 which requires that e has no type
variable, Theorem VII.1 only requires that e is well-typed in
the public view.
Our example program m.f m.x typechecks at int, so by
Theorem VII.1 it is TRNI(POE, int).
A. Usage of our approach
We can use our approach with ordinary ML implemen-
tations. In the case that the source programs are already
parameterized by one module for their confidential inputs and
their declassifiers, then there is no need to modify source
programs at all.
For example, we consider program described below. Here
M is a module of the transparent signature transOE. By
sealing this module with the opaque signature opaqOE, we get
the module opaqM 6. Intuitively, program is TRNI(POE, int)
since the declassifier f is applied to the confidential input x.
We also come to the same conclusion from the fact that the
type of this program is int.
6The module opaqOE can only be accessed via the interface defined by
opaqOE. Details about sealing can be found in [44].
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structure M = struct
type t = int
val x : t = 1
val f : t -> int = fn x => x mod 2
end
structure opaqM :> opaqOE = M
val program : int = opaqM.f opaqM.x
So far our discussion is about open terms but the ML type
checker only applies to closed terms. In the case that the client
program is open (i.e. that it can receive any module of the
transparent signature as an input, as in the program m.f m.x
presented above), in order to be able to type check it for a
policy, we need to close it by putting in a closing context,
which we call wrapper. For any program e and policy P , the
wrapper is written using a functor as shown below, where
opaqP is the opaque signature for the public view of P . Type
τ is the type at which we want to check security of e. (The
identifiers program and wrapper are arbitrary.)
functor wrapper (structure m: opaqP) =
struct
val program : τ = e
end
Note that e is unchanged.
We have proved that if the wrapper wrapP(e) is of the
signature from opaqP to τ , then the type of e in the public
view is τ . Therefore, from Theorem VII.1, e is TRNI at τ . For
instance, for the policy POE, we have that wrapP(m.f m.x)
is of the signature from transOE to int and hence, we infer
that the type of m.f m.x in the public view is int and hence,
m.f m.x is TRNI(POE, int).
B. Extension
As in the case of the simple calculus, our encoding for ML
can also be extended for global policies. Here, for illustration
purpose, we present the encoding for a global policy which is
inspired by two-factor authentication.
Example VII.2. The policy PAut involves two confi-
dential passwords and two declassifiers checking1 and
checking2 as below, where input1 and input2 are
respectively the first input and the second input from a user.
Notice that checking2 takes a tuple of two passwords as its
input.
fun checking1(password1:int) =
if (password1 = input1) then 1 else 0
fun checking2(passwords:int*int) =
if ((#1 passwords) = input1) then
if ((#2 passwords) = input2) then 1 else 0
else 2
We next construct the confidential view and the public
view for the policy. Since the policy involves two confidential
passwords, by using the idea presented in §VI-B, we introduce
a new variable (i.e. passwords) which corresponding to
the tuple of the two passwords. The transparent and public
signatures used for the confidential and the public views of
PAut are as below.
signature transAut = sig
type t1 = int
val password1:t1
val checking1:t1->int
type t2 = int
val password2:t2
type t3 = int * int
val passwords:t3
val checking2:t3 ->int
end
signature opaqAut = sig
type t1
val password1:t1
val checking1:t1->int
type t2
val password2:t2
type t3
val passwords:t3
val checking2:t3->int
end
We have that programs m.checking2 m.passwords
and m.checking1 m.password1, where m is a module
variable of the transparent signature transAut, have the
type int in the public view and hence both programs are
TRNI(PAut, int).
VIII. CONCLUSION
We show how to express declassification policies by using
standard types of the simply typed lambda calculus as well
as a module calculus that covers a large fragment of pure
ML. By means of parametricity, we prove soundness for
TRNI, showing a direct connection between declassification
and parametricity. Although we focus on confidentiality and
declassification, our approach applies as well to integrity and
endorsement. Many endorsement policies involve sanitization
functions that are explicitly applied in the code, which fits well
with the wrapper style of interface.
Our approach should be applicable to other languages that
have an abstraction theorem (e.g [33], [34], [37]–[39]) with
the potential benefit of strong security assurance from off the
shelf type checkers. To realize this potential, one current limi-
tation remains a significant challenge. The abstraction theorem
characterizes the overall behavior of a program unit, whereas
practical information flow policies distinguish between parts
of the behavior considered visible to observers of differing
classification. Computations producing both secret and public
outputs can be expressed in DCC, for example, and the
encodings of DCC (Section II) handle this by translation of the
source code as well as types. An open problem is whether this
is a fundamental limitation; in particular, do type systems like
that of ML admit an encoding such that TRNI for multi-level
computations can be checked on un-modified source code?
Given that logical relations can exactly characterize con-
textual equivalence [9], [43], [46], a natural alternative to our
use of the abstraction theorem is to formulate TRNI via some
policy-determined notion of context. In exploring that idea we
obtained preliminary results in which the logical relation-based
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indistinguishability implies contextual equivalence-based in-
distinguishability, but further investigation is needed.
Vanhoef et al. [47] and others have proposed more ex-
pressive declassification policies than the ones in Li and
Zdancewic [12]: policies that keep state and can be written as
programs. We speculate that TRNI for stateful declassification
policies can be obtained for free in a language with state—
indeed, our work provides motivation for development of
abstraction theorems for such languages.
Another direction of future work is to formalize our results
in Coq, building on Crary’s formalization [9]. We do not see
impediments to doing so, but it is a substantial development
and in fact has not yet been ported to the current version of
Coq [48]. Such a formalization would be especially valuable
once we have overcome some limitations of our current results,
so that the approach can be applied to real programs.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF SECTION IV
Lemma IV.1. Suppose that ρ ∈ Rel(δ1, δ2) for some δ1 and δ2. For i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows that:
• if 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ, then ⊢ vi : δi(τ), and
• if 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρ , then ⊢ ei : δi(τ).
Proof. The second part of the lemma follows directly from rule FR-Term. We prove the first part of the lemma by induction
on structure of τ .
Case 1: int. We consider 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[int]]ρ. From FR-Int, we have that ⊢ vi : int. Since δi(int) = int, we have that
⊢ vi : δ(int).
Case 2: α. We consider 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[α]]ρ. From the FR-Var rule, 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ ρ(α) ∈ Rel(δ1(α), δ2(α)). From the definition of
Rel(δ1(α), δ2(α)), we have that ⊢ vi : δi(α).
Case 3: τ1×τ2. We consider 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1×τ2]]ρ. We then have that v1 = 〈v11, v12〉 for some v11 and v12 and v2 = 〈v21, v22〉
for some v21 and v22. From FR-Pair, it follows that 〈v11, v21〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ and 〈v12, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ. From IH (on τ1 and τ2), we
have that ⊢ v11 : δ1(τ1), ⊢ v21 : δ2(τ1), ⊢ v12 : δ1(τ2), and ⊢ v22 : δ2(τ2). From FT-Pair, ⊢ 〈v11, v12〉 : δ1(τ1) × δ1(τ2) and
⊢ 〈v21, v22〉 : δ2(τ1)× δ2(τ2). Thus, ⊢ v1 : δ1(τ1)× δ1(τ2) and ⊢ v2 : δ2(τ1)× δ2(τ2). In other words, ⊢ v1 : δ1(τ1 × τ2) and
⊢ v2 : δ2(τ1 × τ2).
Case 4: τ1 → τ2. We consider 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρ. We now look at arbitrary 〈v′1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ. From FR-Fun, it follows
that 〈v1v
′
1, v2v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρ . From IH on τ1 and the second part of the lemma on τ2, we have that ⊢ v
′
i : δi(τ1) and ⊢ viv
′
i : δi(τ2)
(for i ∈ {1, 2}). From FT-App, we have that ⊢ vi : δi(τ1 → τ2).
Theorem IV.3. If ∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ , then ∆,Γ ⊢ e ∼ e : τ .
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on typing derivation.
Case 1: Rule FT-Int.
⊢ n : int
From FR-Int, we have that 〈n, n〉 ∈ [[int]]ρ. Therefore, from FR-Term, it follows that 〈n, n〉 ∈ [[int]]evρ . Hence,
〈δ1γ1(n), δ2γ2(n)〉 ∈ [[int]]evρ . The proof is closed for this case.
Case 2: Rule FT-Var.
x : τ ∈ Γ
∆,Γ ⊢ x : τ
Since 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[Γ]]ρ and x ∈ dom(γ1) = dom(γ2), we have that 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[Γ(x)]]ρ, and hence 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈
[[Γ(x)]]evρ .
Since there is no type variable in x, we have that δ1γ1(x) = γ1(x) and δ2γ2(x) = γ2(x). As proven above, 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈
[[τ ]]evρ . Thus, we have that 〈δ1γ1(x), δ2γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρ . The proof is closed for this case.
Case 3: Rule FT-Pair.
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 ∆,Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ1 × τ2
From IH, it follows that
• 〈δ1γ1(e1), δ2γ2(e1)〉 ∈ [[τ1]]evρ , and
• 〈δ1γ1(e2), δ2γ2(e2)〉 ∈ [[τ2]]evρ .
From the FR-Term, we have that
• 〈v11, v12〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ, where 〈δ1γ1(e1), δ2γ2(e1)〉 _∗ 〈v11, v12〉, and
• 〈v21, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ, where 〈δ1γ1(e2), δ2γ2(e2)〉 _∗ 〈v21, v22〉.
From FR-Pair, it follows that 〈〈v11, v21〉, 〈v12, v22〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρ. From FR-Term, we have that
〈〈δ1γ1(e1), δ1γ1(e2)〉, 〈δ2γ2(e1), δ2γ2(e2)〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]
ev
ρ .
Thus, 〈δ1γ1〈e1, e2〉, δ2γ2〈e1, e2〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]evρ . This case is closed.
Case 4: rule FT-Prj.
∆,Γ ⊢ e : τ1 × τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ πie : τi
From IH, we have that 〈δ1γ1(e), δ2γ2(e)〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]evρ . Thus, 〈〈v11, v21〉, 〈v12, v22〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρ, where δ1γ1(e) _
∗
〈v11, v21〉 and δ2γ2(e) _∗ 〈v12, v22〉. From FR-Pair, we have that 〈v11, v12〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ and 〈v21, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ.
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Since δ1γ1(e) _
∗ 〈v11, v21〉 and δ2γ2(e) _∗ 〈v12, v22〉
• π1δ1γ1(e) _
∗ v11,
• π2δ1γ1(e) _
∗ v12,
• π1δ2γ2(e) _
∗ v12,
• π2δ2γ2(e) _
∗ v22.
Thus,
• δ1γ1(π1e) _
∗ v11,
• δ1γ1(π2e) _
∗ v12,
• δ2γ2(π1e) _
∗ v12,
• δ2γ2(π2e) _
∗ v22.
Thus,
• 〈δ1γ1(π1e), δ2γ2(π1e)〉 _∗ 〈v11, v12〉 and
• 〈δ1γ1(π2e), δ2γ2(π2e)〉 _∗ 〈v12,v22〉.
As proven above 〈v11, v12〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ and 〈v21, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ. From FR-Term, we have that 〈δ1γ1(π1e), δ2γ2(π1e)〉 ∈ [[τ1]]evρ
and 〈δ1γ1(π2e), δ2γ2(π2e)〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρ . This case is closed.
Case 5: rule FT-Fun.
∆,Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ e : τ2
∆,Γ ⊢ λx : τ1.e : τ1 → τ2
From IH, we have that 〈δ1γ1[x 7→ v1](e), δ2γ2[x 7→ v2](e)〉 ∈ [[τ2]]evρ , where 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]
ev
ρ . Hence, we have that
〈δ1γ1(e[x 7→ v1]), δ2γ2(e[x 7→ v2])〉 ∈ [[τ2]]evρ . From the semantics of the language and the FR-Term rule, it follows that
〈δ1γ1((λx : τ1.e)v1]), δ2γ2((λx : τ1.e)v2)〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρ .
Since 〈v1, v2〉 are arbitrary, from FR-Fun, we have that 〈δ1γ1(λx : τ1.e), δ2γ2(λx : τ1.e)〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρ, and hence
〈δ1γ1(λx : τ1.e), δ2γ2(λx : τ1.e)〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]evρ . The proof is closed for this case.
Case 6: rule FT-App.
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 ∆,Γ ⊢ e2 : τ1
∆,Γ ⊢ e1 e2 : τ2
The proof follows from IH and rule FR-Fun.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF SECTION V
Lemma V.7. ρP ∈ Rel(δP , δP).
Proof. We need to prove that for any type variable α, if 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ ρP(α), then ⊢ vi : δP(α) and hence ⊢ vi : int according
to the definition (1). This follows directly from the definition of ρP and rules Eq-Var1, Eq-Var2, and Eq-Var3.
Lemma B.1. Suppose that ⊢ v : τ It follows that:
• if τ is int, v is n for some n,
• if τ is τ1 → τ2, v is λx : τ1.e for some e,
• if τ is τ1 × τ2, it is 〈v1, v2〉 for some v1 and v2.
Proof. We prove the case of int first by case analysis on typing rules. The FT-Int rule gives us the desired result. The other
rules cannot be instantiated with an expression that is a value and of the int type.
We prove the case of τ1 → τ2 by case analysis on typing rules. The FT-Fun rule gives us the desired result. The other rules
cannot be instantiated with an expression that is a value and of the τ1 → τ2 type.
The proof for the case τ1 × τ2 is similar.
Lemma V.8. It follows that
• 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρP iff 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ ]], and
• 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρP iff 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]].
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structure of τ .
Case 1: int. We consider IV [[int]] and [[int]]ρP We have that 〈n, n〉 ∈ [[int]]ρP iff 〈n, n〉 ∈ IV [[int]].
We consider IE [[int]] and [[int]]evρP . We consider 〈e1, e2〉.
• If 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IV [[int]], from Eq-Term and Eq-Int, there exists n s.t. ei _∗ n. From FR-Int and FR-Term, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[int]]evρP .
• If 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[int]]evρP , from FR-Term and FR-Int, there exists n s.t. ei _
∗ n. From Eq-Int and Eq-Term, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[int]].
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Case 2: αx. First we consider IV [[αx]] and [[αx]]ρP . From the definition of ρP and the FR-Var rule, 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[αx]]ρP iff
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αx]].
Case 3: αf . The proof is similar to the one of Case 2.
Case 4: αf◦a. The proof is similar to the one of Case 2.
Case 5: τ1 × τ2. We first consider IV [[τ1 × τ2]] and [[τ1 × τ2]]ρP .
• Suppose that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 × τ2]]. From the definition of indistinguishability, we have that ⊢ vi : δP(τ1 × τ2). From
Lemma B.1, v1 = 〈v11, v12〉 and v2 = 〈v21, v22〉. Thus, we have that 〈〈v11, v12〉, 〈v21, v22〉〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 × τ2]]. From
the Eq-Pair rule, we have that 〈v11, v21〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]] and 〈v12, v22〉 ∈ IV [[τ2]]. From IH on τ1 and τ2, we have that
〈v11, v21〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρP and 〈v12, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρP . From the FR-Pair, it follows that 〈〈v11, v12〉, 〈v21, v22〉〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρP .
• Suppose that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρP . From Lemma IV.1, ⊢ vi : δP(τ1 × τ2). Thus, we have that 〈〈v11, v12〉, 〈v21, v22〉〉 ∈
[[τ1 × τ2]]ρP . From the FR-Pair rule, we have that 〈v11, v21〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρP and 〈v12, v22〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρP . From IH on τ1 and τ2,
we have that 〈v11, v21〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]] and 〈v12, v22〉 ∈ IV [[τ2]]. From the Eq-Pair, it follows that 〈〈v11, v12〉, 〈v21, v22〉〉 ∈
IV [[τ1 × τ2]].
We now consider IE [[τ1 × τ2]] and [[τ1 × τ2]]evρP .
• Suppose that 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ1 × τ2]]. From Eq-Term, we have that ei _∗ vi for some vi and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 × τ2]]. As
proven above, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρP . From FR-Term, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]
ev
ρP
.
• Suppose that 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]
ev
ρP
. From FR-Term, we have that ei _
∗ vi for some vi and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 × τ2]]ρP . As
proven above, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 × τ2]]. From Eq-Term, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ1 × τ2]].
Case 6: τ1 → τ2. We first consider IV [[τ1 → τ2]] and [[τ1 → τ2]]ρP .
• Suppose 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 → τ2]]. We need to prove that for any 〈v′1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρP , 〈v1v
′
1, v2v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρP
.
Since 〈v′1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρP , from IH on τ1, we have that 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]]. Since 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 → τ2]], from Eq-Fun, we
have that 〈v1 v′1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ IE [[τ2]]. From IH on τ2, 〈v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρP
.
• Suppose that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρP . We need to prove that for any 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]], 〈v1v
′
1, v2v
′
2〉 ∈ IE [[τ2]].
Since 〈v′1, v
′
2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1]], from IH on τ1, we have that 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρP . Since 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρP , from Eq-Fun, we
have that 〈v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρP
. From IH on τ2, 〈v1 v
′
1, v2 v
′
2〉 ∈ IE [[τ2]].
We now consider IE [[τ1 → τ2]] and [[τ1 → τ2]]
ev
ρP
.
• Suppose that 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ1 → τ2]]. From Eq-Term, ei _∗ vi for some vi and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 → τ2]]. As proven
above, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρP . Thus, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]
ev
ρP
.
• Suppose that 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]evρP . From FR-Term, ei _
∗ vi for some vi and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ1 → τ2]]ρP . As proven
above, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ1 → τ2]]. Thus, 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ1 → τ2]].
Lemma V.9. If 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]], then 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ [[ΓPP ]]ρP .
Proof. We first prove that dom(γ1) = dom(γ2) = dom(Γ
P
P ). This is directly from the definition of 〈γ1, γ2〉 ∈ IV [[P ]].
We now need to prove that 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[ΓPP ]]ρP for all x. From the construction of Γ
P
P , we have the following cases.
Case 1: ΓPP (x) = αx. From the assumption, we have that
〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[αx]].
From Lemma V.8, it follows that 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[αx]]ρP .
Case 2: ΓPP (x) = αf From the assumption, we have that
〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[αf ]].
From Lemma V.8, it follows that 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[αf ]]ρP .
Case 3: ΓPP (xf ) = αf → τ . We need to prove that 〈f, f〉 ∈ [[αf → τ ]]ρP , where ⊢ f : int → τ for some τ s.t. ⊢ τ . From
FR-Fun, we need to prove that for any 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]ρP , 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρP
.
We consider an arbitrary 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]ρP . From the Eq-Var2 rule, we have that 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]. From Lemma V.8,
〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρP .
Case 4: ΓPP (x) = αf◦a From the assumption, we have that
〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ IV [[αf◦a]].
From Lemma V.8, it follows that 〈γ1(x), γ2(x)〉 ∈ [[αf◦a]]ρP .
Case 5: ΓPP (xa) = αf◦a → αf . We need to prove that 〈a, a〉 ∈ [[αf◦a → αf ]]ρP , where ⊢ a : int→ int. From FR-Fun, we
need to prove that for any 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[αf◦a]]ρP , 〈a v1, a v2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]
ev
ρP
.
We consider an arbitrary 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[αf◦a]]ρP . From the Eq-Var3 rule, we have that 〈a v1, a v2〉 ∈ IE [[αf ]]. From Lemma V.8,
〈a v1, a v2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]evρP .
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k ::= 1 | T | S(c) | Πα : k.k | Σα : k.k kind
c, τ ::= α | ⋆ | λα : k.c | c c | 〈c, c〉 | π1c | π2c type constructor
| unit | int | τ1 → τ2 | τ1 × τ2 | ∀α : k.τ | ∃α : k.τ
σ ::= 1 | (|k|) | 〈|τ |〉 | Πgnα : σ.σ | Πapα : σ.σ | Σα : σ.σ signature
e ::= x | ⋆ | n | λx : τ.e | e e | 〈e, e〉 | π1e | π2e | Λα : k.e | e[c] term
| pack[c, e] as ∃α : k.τ | unpack[α, x] = e in e | fixτe
| let x = e in e | let α/m = M in e | Ext M
M ::= m | ⋆ | (|c|) | 〈|e|〉 | λgnα/m : σ.M | M M | λapα/m : σ.M module
| M ·M | 〈M,M〉 | π1M | π2M | unpack[α, x] = e in (M : σ)
| let x = e in M | let α/m = M in (M : σ) | M :> σ
Γ ::= . | Γ, α : k | Γ, x : τ | Γ, α/m : σ context
Fig. 4. Module calculus
α/m ∈ dom(Γ)
Γ ⊢ Fst(m)≫ α Γ ⊢ Fst(⋆)≫ ⋆ Γ ⊢ Fst((|c|))≫ c Γ ⊢ Fst(〈|e|〉)≫ ⋆ Γ ⊢ Fst(λgnα/m : σ.M)≫ ⋆
Γ, α/m : σ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c
Γ ⊢ Fst(λapα/m : σ.M) ≫ λα : Fst(σ).c
Γ ⊢ Fst(M1)≫ c1 Γ ⊢ Fst(M2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢ Fst(M1 ·M2)≫ c1c2
Γ ⊢ Fst(M1)≫ c1 Γ ⊢ Fst(M2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢ Fst(〈M1,M2〉)≫ 〈c1, c2〉
Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c
Γ ⊢ Fst(πiM)≫ πic
Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c
Γ ⊢ Fst(let x = e in M)≫ c
Fig. 5. Extracting constructor information from modules
APPENDIX C
MODULE CALCULUS
A. Syntax and semantics
This section presents a module calculus, essentially the same as that of Crary [9] except that we add int for integers. Crary’s
calculus is adapted from Dreyer’s thesis [44], and the reader should consult these references for explanations and motivation.
The calculus has static expressions: kinds (k), constructors (c) and signatures (σ), and dynamic expressions: terms (e) and
modules (M ). The syntax is in Fig. 4.
a) Kinds and constructors: The unit kind 1 has only the unit constructor ⋆. The kind T have base types that can be used
to classify terms. The singleton kind S(c) (where c is of the base kind) has constructors that are definitionally equivalent to
c. In addition, we have higher kinds: dependent functions Πα : k1.k2 and dependent pairs Σα : k1.k2. A constructor c of the
kind Σα : k1.k2 has pairs of constructors where the first component π1c is of the kind k1 and the second component π2c is of
the kind k2[α 7→ π1c]. A constructor c of the kind Πα : k1.k2 takes a constructor c′ of kind k1 as a parameter and returns a
constructor of the kind k2[α 7→ c′]. When α does not appear free in k2, we write k1 → k2 instead of Πα : k1.k2 and k1 × k2
instead of Σα : k1.k2. We use the metavariable τ for constructors that are types (i.e. of the kind T).
b) Terms and modules: The syntax for terms is standard. Modules can be unit module, static atomic module, dynamic
atomic module, generative functor, applicative functor, application, pair, projection, unpack, term binding, module binding, and
sealing. Applications of generative functors and applicative functors are syntactically distinguished.
Abstraction is introduced by sealing: in the module M :> σ, access to the component M is limited to the interface σ. A
term is extracted from a module 〈|e|〉 by Ext 〈|e|〉. To extract the static part of a module, we have the operation Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c
meaning that the static part of M is c in Γ. When the context is empty, we write Fst(M) for c where ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c.
Notice that every module variable is associated with a constructor variable that represents its static part [9]. The relation is
maintained by twinned variables: α/m : σ meaning that m has signature σ and its static part is α which is of the kind Fst(σ),
where for any signature σ, Fst(σ) extracts the information about kind from σ. Whenever m : σ and Fst(m) ≫ c, it follows
that c is of the kind Fst(σ).
Fst(1) , 1 Fst(Πgnα : σ1.σ2) , 1
Fst((|k|)) , k Fst(Πapα : σ1.σ2) , Πα : Fst(σ1).Fst(σ2)
Fst(〈|τ |〉) , 1 Fst(Σα : σ1.σ2) , Σα : Fst(σ1).Fst(σ2)
Fig. 6. Extracting kind information from signatures
18
⊢ Γ ok Well-formed context (Fig 8)
Γ ⊢ k : kind Well-formed kind (Fig 9)
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind Kind equivalence (Fig 10)
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind Subkinding (Fig 11)
Γ ⊢ c : k Well-formed constructor (Fig 12)
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : kind Constructor equivalence (Fig 13)
Γ ⊢ e : τ Well-typed term (Fig 14)
Γ ⊢ σ : sig Well-formed signature (Fig 15)
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≡ σ2 : sig Equivalence signature (Fig 16)
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≤ σ2 : sig Subsignature (Fig 17)
Γ ⊢P M : σ Pure well-formed module (Fig 18)
Γ ⊢I M : σ Impure well-formed module (Fig 18)
Fig. 7. Judgment forms in the static semantics
c) Signature: Signatures include unit signature, atomic kind signature, atomic type signature, signatures for generative
functors, applicative functors and pairs. Since a module does not appear in static part of a signature, we have only α in
dependent signatures (instead of twinned variables, e.g. α/m, as in the case of modules). In the binding α : σ within a
dependent signature, α corresponds to the static part of some module of the signature σ. Thus, α has the kind Fst(σ).
As described in [44], a signature σ is transparent when it exposes the implementation of the static part of modules of σ. A
signature σ is opaque when it hides some information about the static part of modules of σ.
Example C.1. We consider the following module and signatures. Suppose that f = λx : int.e for some e which is a closed
function of the type int→ τf for some closed τf .
structure M =
struct
type t = int
val x:t = 0
val f:t->int = ...
end
signature σT =
sig
type t = int
val x:int
val f:int -> τf
end
signature σO =
sig
type t
val x:t
val f:t -> τf
end
In the module calculus, M is 〈(|int|), 〈〈|0|〉, 〈|λx : int.e|〉〉〉. Using abbreviations, σT is 〈(|S(int)|), 〈〈|int|〉, 〈|int→ τf |〉〉〉 and
σO is Σα : (|T|).〈〈|α|〉, 〈|α→ τf |〉〉.7 The signature σT is a transparent signature of M since σT exposes the information of the
static part of M , as (|S(int)|). The signature σO is an opaque signature of M since σO hides the information of the static part
of M , as (|T|).
d) Static semantics: The judgment forms in the static semantics are described in Figure 7. W.r.t. the static semantics, for
the signatures described in Example C.1, it follows that the transparent signature σT is a sub-signature of the opaque signature
σO .
WF NIL
⊢ . ok
WF CN
⊢ Γ ok Γ ⊢ k : kind
⊢ Γ, α : k ok
WF TM
⊢ Γ ok Γ ⊢ τ : T
⊢ Γ, x : τ ok
WF MD
⊢ Γ ok Γ ⊢ σ : sig
⊢ Γ, α/m : σ ok
Fig. 8. Well-formed context ⊢ Γ ok
OFK TYPE
Γ ⊢ T : kind
OFK SING
Γ ⊢ c : T
Γ ⊢ S(c) : kind
OFK ONE
Γ ⊢ 1 : kind
OFK PI
Γ ⊢ k1 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ Πα : k1.k2 : kind
OFK SIGMA
Γ ⊢ k1 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ Σα : k1.k2 : kind
Fig. 9. Well-formed kind Γ ⊢ k : kind
7Expanding abbreviations, σT is Σα : (|S(int)|).Σβ : 〈|int|〉.〈|int→ τf |〉 and σO is Σα : (|T|).Σβ : 〈|α|〉.〈|α→ τf |〉.
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EQK REFL
Γ ⊢ k : kind
Γ ⊢ k ≡ k : kind
EQK SYMM
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ k2 ≡ k1 : kind
EQK TRANS
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind Γ ⊢ k2 ≡ k3 : kind
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k3 : kind
EQK SING
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : T
Γ ⊢ S(c1) ≡ S(c2) : kind
EQK PI
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k3 ≡ k4 : kind
Γ ⊢ Πα : k1.k3 ≡ Πα : k2.k4 : kind
EQK SIGMA
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k3 ≡ k4 : kind
Γ ⊢ Σα : k1.k3 ≡ Σα : k2.k4 : kind
Fig. 10. Kind equivalence Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind
SUBK REFL
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind
SUBK TRANS
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind Γ ⊢ k2 ≤ k3 : kind
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k3 : kind
SUBK SING T
Γ ⊢ c : T
Γ ⊢ S(c) ≤ T : kind
SUBK PI
Γ ⊢ k′1 ≤ k1 : kind Γ, α : k
′
1 ⊢ k2 ≤ k
′
2 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ Πα : k1.k2 ≤ Πα : k
′
1.k
′
2 : kind
SUBK SIGMA
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k
′
1 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 ≤ k
′
2 : kind Γ, α : k
′
1 ⊢ k
′
2 : kind
Γ ⊢ Σα : k1.k2 ≤ Σα : k
′
1.k
′
2 : kind
Fig. 11. Subkinding Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind
OFC VAR
Γ(α) = k
Γ ⊢ α : k
OFC LAM
Γ ⊢ k1 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ c : k2
Γ ⊢ λα : k1.c : Πα : k1.k2
OFC APP
Γ ⊢ c1 : Πα : k1.k2 Γ ⊢ c2 : k1
Γ ⊢ c1c2 : k2[α 7→ c2]
OFC PAIR
Γ ⊢ c1 : k1 Γ ⊢ c2 : k2[α 7→ c1] Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ 〈c1, c2〉 : Σα : k1.k2
OFC PI1
Γ ⊢ c : Σα : k1.k2
Γ ⊢ π1c : k1
OFC PI2
Γ ⊢ c : Σα : k1.k2
Γ ⊢ π2c : k2[α 7→ π1c]
OFC STAR
Γ ⊢ ⋆ : 1
OFC UNIT
Γ ⊢ unit : T
OFC INT
Γ ⊢ int : T
OFC ARROW
Γ ⊢ τ1 : T Γ ⊢ τ2 : T
Γ ⊢ τ1 → τ2 : T
OFC PROD
Γ ⊢ τ1 : T Γ ⊢ τ2 : T
Γ ⊢ τ1 × τ2 : T
OFC ALL
Γ ⊢ k : kind Γ, α : k ⊢ τ : T
Γ ⊢ ∀α : k.τ : T
OFC EXISTS
Γ ⊢ k : kind Γ, α : k ⊢ τ : T
Γ ⊢ ∃α : k.τ : T
OFC SING
Γ ⊢ c : T
Γ ⊢ c : S(c)
OFC EXTPI
Γ ⊢ c : Πα : k1.k2 Γ, α : k1 ⊢ cα : k
′
2
Γ ⊢ c : Πα : k1.k
′
2
OFC EXTSIGMA
Γ ⊢ π1c : k1 Γ ⊢ π2c : k2[α 7→ π1c] Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ c : Σα : k1.k2
OFC SUBSUME
Γ ⊢ c : k Γ ⊢ k ≤ k′ : kind
Γ ⊢ c : k′
Fig. 12. Well-formed constructor Γ ⊢ c : k
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EQC REFL
Γ ⊢ c : k
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c : k
EQC SYMM
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k
Γ ⊢ c2 ≡ c1 : k
EQC TRANS
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k Γ ⊢ c2 ≡ c3 : k
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c3 : k
EQC LAM
Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k
′
1 : kind Γ, α : k1 ⊢ c ≡ c
′ : k2
Γ ⊢ λα : k1.c ≡ λα : k
′
1.c
′ : Πα : k1.k2
EQC APP
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c
′
1 : Πα : k1.k2 Γ ⊢ c2 ≡ c
′
2 : k1
Γ ⊢ c1c2 ≡ c
′
1c
′
2 : k2[α 7→ c2]
EQC PAIR
Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c
′
1 : k1 Γ ⊢ c2 ≡ c
′
2 : k2[α 7→ c1] Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ 〈c1, c2〉 ≡ 〈c
′
1, c
′
2〉 : Σα : k1.k2
EQC PI1
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Σα : k1.k2
Γ ⊢ π1c ≡ π1c
′ : k1
EQC PI2
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Σα : k1.k2
Γ ⊢ π2c ≡ π2c
′ : k2[α 7→ π1c]
EQC ARROW
Γ ⊢ τ1 ≡ τ
′
1 : T Γ ⊢ τ2 ≡ τ
′
2 : T
Γ ⊢ τ1 → τ2 ≡ τ
′
1 → τ
′
2 : T
EQC PROD
Γ ⊢ τ1 ≡ τ
′
1 : T Γ ⊢ τ2 ≡ τ
′
2 : T
Γ ⊢ τ1 × τ2 ≡ τ
′
1 × τ
′
2 : T
EQC ALL
Γ ⊢ k ≡ k′ : kind Γ, α : k ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T
Γ ⊢ ∀α : k.τ ≡ ∀α : k′.τ ′ : T
EQC EXISTS
Γ ⊢ k ≡ k′ : kind Γ, α : k ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T
Γ ⊢ ∃α : k.τ ≡ ∃α : k′.τ ′ : T
EQC SING
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : T
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : S(c)
EQC SINGELIM
Γ ⊢ c : S(c′)
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : T
EQC EXTPI
Γ ⊢ c : Πα : k1.k
′
2 Γ ⊢ c
′ : Πα : k1.k
′′
2 Γ, α : k1 ⊢ cα ≡ c
′α : k2
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Πα : k1.k2
EQC EXTPIW
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Πα : k1.k
′
2 Γ, α : k1 ⊢ cα ≡ c
′α : k2
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Πα : k1.k2
EQC EXTSIGMA
Γ ⊢ π1c ≡ π1c
′ : k1 Γ ⊢ π2c ≡ π2c
′ : k2[α 7→ π1c] Γ, α : k1 ⊢ k2 : kind
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : Σα : k1.k2
EQC EXTONE
Γ ⊢ c : 1 Γ ⊢ c′ : 1
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : 1
EQC SUBSUME
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : k Γ ⊢ k ≤ k′ : kind
Γ ⊢ c ≡ c′ : k′
EQC BETA
Γ, α : k1 ⊢ c2 : k2 Γ ⊢ c1 : k1
Γ ⊢ (λα : k1.c2)c1 ≡ c2[α 7→ c1] : k2[α 7→ c2]
EQC BETA1
Γ ⊢ c1 : k1 Γ ⊢ c2 : k2
Γ ⊢ π1〈c1, c2〉 ≡ c1 : k1
EQC BETA2
Γ ⊢ c1 : k1 Γ ⊢ c2 : k2
Γ ⊢ π2〈c1, c2〉 ≡ c2 : k2
Fig. 13. Constructor equivalence Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k
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OFT VAR
Γ(x) = τ
Γ ⊢ x : τ
OFT STAR
Γ ⊢ ⋆ : unit
OFT INT
Γ ⊢ n : int
OFT LAM
Γ ⊢ τ1 : T Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ e : τ2
Γ ⊢ λx : τ1.e : τ1 → τ2
OFT APP
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 → τ2 Γ ⊢ e2 : τ1
Γ ⊢ e1e2 : τ2
OFT PAIR
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 Γ ⊢ e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 : τ1 × τ2
OFT PI1
Γ ⊢ e : τ1 × τ2
Γ ⊢ π1e : τ1
OFT PI2
Γ ⊢ e : τ1 × τ2
Γ ⊢ π2e : τ2
OFT PLAM
Γ ⊢ k : kind Γ, α : k ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢ Λα : k.e : ∀α : k.τ
OFT PAPP
Γ ⊢ e : ∀α : k.τ Γ ⊢ c : k
Γ ⊢ e[c] : τ [α 7→ c]
OFT PACK
Γ ⊢ c : k Γ ⊢ e : τ [α 7→ c] Γ, α : k ⊢ τ : T
Γ ⊢ pack[c, e] as ∃α : k.τ : ∃α : k.τ
OFT UNPACK
Γ ⊢ e1 : ∃α : k.τ Γ, α : k, x : τ ⊢ e2 : τ
′ Γ ⊢ τ ′ : T
Γ ⊢ unpack[α, x] = e1 in e2 : τ
′
OFT FIX
Γ ⊢ e : (unit → τ)→ τ
Γ ⊢ fixτ e : τ
OFT LETT
Γ ⊢ e1 : τ1 Γ, x : τ1 ⊢ e2 : τ2
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 : τ2
OFT LETM
Γ ⊢I M : σ Γ, α/m : σ ⊢ e : τ Γ ⊢ τ : T
Γ ⊢ let α/m = M in e : τ
OFT EXT
Γ ⊢I M : (|τ |)
Γ ⊢ Ext M : τ
OFT EQUIV
Γ ⊢ e : τ Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T
Γ ⊢ e : τ ′
Fig. 14. Well-typed term Γ ⊢ e : τ
OFS ONE
Γ ⊢ 1 : sig
OFS STAT
Γ ⊢ k : kind
Γ ⊢ (|k|) : sig
OFS DYN
Γ ⊢ τ : T
Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 : sig
OFS PIAPP
Γ ⊢ σ1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πapα : α : σ1.σ2 : sig
OFS PIGEN
Γ ⊢ σ1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πgnα : α : σ1.σ2 : sig
OFS SIGMA
Γ ⊢ σ1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Σα : σ1.σ2 : sig
Fig. 15. Well-formed signature Γ ⊢ σ : sig
EQS REFL
Γ ⊢ σ : sig
Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ : sig
EQS SYMM
Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig
Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ σ : sig
EQS TRANS
Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′′ : sig Γ ⊢ σ′′ ≡ σ′ : sig
Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig
EQS STAT
Γ ⊢ k ≡ k′ : kind
Γ ⊢ (|k|) ≡ (|k′|) : sig
EQS DYN
Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T
Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ 〈|τ ′|〉 : sig
EQS PIGEN
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≡ σ
′
1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 ≡ σ
′
2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πgnα : σ1.σ2 ≡ Π
gnα : σ′1 : σ
′
2 : sig
EQS PIAPP
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≡ σ
′
1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 ≡ σ
′
2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πapα : σ1.σ2 ≡ Π
apα : σ′1.σ
′
2 : sig
EQS SIGMA
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≡ σ
′
1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 ≡ σ
′
2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Σα : σ1.σ2 ≡ Σα : σ
′
1.σ
′
2 : sig
Fig. 16. Signature equivalence Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig
SUBS REFL
Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig
Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig
SUBS TRANS
Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ′′ : sig Γ ⊢ σ′′ ≤ σ′ : sig
Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig
SUBS STAT
Γ ⊢ k ≤ k′ : kind
Γ ⊢ (|k|) ≤ (|k′|) : sig
SUBS PIGEN
Γ ⊢ σ′1 ≤ σ1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ
′
1) ⊢ σ2 ≤ σ
′
2 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πgnα : σ1.σ2 ≤ Π
gnα : σ′1.σ
′
2 : sig
SUBS PIAPP
Γ ⊢ σ′1 ≤ σ1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ
′
1) ⊢ σ2 ≤ σ
′
2 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Πapα : σ1.σ2 ≤ Π
apα : σ′1.σ
′
2 : sig
SUBS SIGMA
Γ ⊢ σ1 ≤ σ
′
1 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ1) ⊢ σ2 ≤ σ
′
2 : sig Γ, α : Fst(σ
′
1) ⊢ σ
′
2 : sig
Γ ⊢ Σα : σ1.σ2 ≤ Σα : σ
′
1.σ
′
2 : sig
Fig. 17. Subsignature Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig
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OFM VAR
Γ(m) = σ
Γ ⊢P m : σ
OFM STAR
Γ ⊢P ⋆ : 1
OFM STAT
Γ ⊢ c : k
Γ ⊢P (|c|) : (|k|)
OFM DYN
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : (|τ |)
OFM LAMGN
Γ ⊢ σ : sig Γ, α/m : σ ⊢I M : σ
′
Γ ⊢P λ
gnα/m : σ.M : Πgnα : σ.σ′
OFM APPGN
Γ ⊢I M1 : Π
gnα : σ.σ′ Γ ⊢P M2 : σ Γ ⊢ Fst(M2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢I M1M2 : σ
′[α 7→ c2]
OFM LAMAP
Γ ⊢ σ : sig Γ, α/m : σ ⊢P M : σ
′
Γ ⊢P λ
apα/m : σ.M : Πapα : σ.σ′
OFM APPAP
Γ ⊢κ M1 : Π
apα : σ.σ′ Γ ⊢P M2 : σ Γ ⊢ Fst(M2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢κ M1 ·M2 : σ
′[α 7→ c2]
OFM PAIR
Γ ⊢κ M1 : σ1 Γ ⊢κ M2 : σ2 α 6∈ FV (σ2)
Γ ⊢κ 〈M1,M2〉 : Σα : σ1.σ2
OFM PI1
Γ ⊢P M : Σα : σ1.σ2
Γ ⊢P π1M : σ1
OFM PI2
Γ ⊢P M : Σα : σ1.σ2 Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c
Γ ⊢P π2M : σ2[α 7→ π1c]
OFM UNPACK
Γ ⊢ e : ∃α : k.τ Γ, α : k, x : τ ⊢I M : σ Γ ⊢ σ : sig
Γ ⊢I unpack[α, x] = e in M : σ : σ
OFM LETT
Γ ⊢ e : τ Γ, x : τ ⊢κ M : σ
Γ ⊢K let x = e in M : σ
OFM LETM
Γ ⊢I M1 : σ Γ, α/m : σ ⊢I M2 : σ
′ Γ ⊢ σ′ : sig
Γ ⊢I let α/m = M1 in (M2 : σ
′) : σ′
OFM SEAL
Γ ⊢I M : σ
Γ ⊢I (M :> σ) : σ)
OFM EXTSTAT
Γ ⊢P M : (|k
′|) Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c Γ ⊢ c : k
Γ ⊢P M : (|k|)
OFM EXTPI
Γ ⊢P M : Π
apα : σ1.σ
′
2 Γ, α/m : σ1 ⊢P M ·m : σ2
Γ ⊢P M : Π
apα : σ1.σ2
OFM EXTSIGMA
Γ ⊢P π1M : σ1 Γ ⊢P π2M : σ2 α 6∈ FV (σ2)
Γ ⊢P M : Σα : σ1.σ2
OFM FORGET
Γ ⊢P M : σ
Γ ⊢I M : σ
OFM SUBSUME
Γ ⊢κ M : σ Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ
′ : sig
Γ ⊢K M : σ
′
Fig. 18. Well-formed module Γ ⊢κ M : σ
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SUBS SIGMA
SUBS STAT
SUBK SING T
OFC INT
⊢ int : T
⊢ S(int) ≤ T : kind
⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig
SUBS REFL
EQS DYN
EQC SYMM
EQC SINGELIM
OFC VAR
α : S(int) ⊢ α : S(int)
α : S(int) ⊢ α ≡ int : T
α : S(int) ⊢ int ≡ α : T
α : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≡ 〈|α|〉 : sig
α : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|α|〉 : sig
OFS DYN
OFC VAR
α : T ⊢ α : T
α : T ⊢ 〈|α|〉 : sig
⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 ≤ Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉
Fig. 19. Derivation of ⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 ≤ Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉
Example C.2 (Opaque signature). We consider a module M = 〈(|int|), 〈|0|〉〉 and show that it has the opaque signature
σO = Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉 8. We then have that M is a pure module of the signature σO (i.e. ⊢P M : σO).
First, we have that M is a module of a transparent signature, i.e. ⊢P M : Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 by instantiating the ofm pair
rule.
OFM PAIR
⊢P (|int|) : (|S(int)|) ⊢P 〈|0|〉 : 〈|int|〉 α 6∈ FV (〈|int|〉)
⊢P M : Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉
Next, we have that ⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 ≤ Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉, by the derivation described in Fig. 19:
Finally, it follows that ⊢P M : σO .
OFM SUBSUME
⊢P 〈(|int|), 〈|0|〉〉 : Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 ⊢ Σα : (|S(int)|).〈|int|〉 ≤ Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉
⊢P M : Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉
From [9], we have the following lemma about the correctness of Fst(M)≫ c operation.
Lemma C.3. If Γ ⊢P M : σ then Γ ⊢ Fst(M)≫ c and Γ ⊢ c : Fst(σ).
To facilitate the proofs about TRNI for ML, from the static semantics, we have the following lemma.
Lemma C.4 (Weakening). Suppose that ⊢ Γ, α : k ok. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ σ : sig, then Γ, α : k ⊢ σ : sig,
• if Γ ⊢ c : k′, then Γ, α : k ⊢ c : k′,
• if Γ ⊢ k′ : kind, then Γ, α : k ⊢ k′ : kind,
• if Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind, then Γ, α : k ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind,
• if Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind, then Γ, α : k ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind,
• if Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k
′, then Γ, α : k ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k
′.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ σ : sig, Γ ⊢ c : k′, Γ ⊢ k′ : kind, Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2 : kind,
Γ ⊢ k1 ≤ k2 : kind, and Γ ⊢ c1 ≡ c2 : k′.
e) Dynamic semantics: The dynamic semantics is given by call-by value semantics. We have dynamic semantics for terms
Γ ⊢ e _ e′ and for modules Γ ⊢ M _ M ′ (see Fig. 20 and Fig. 21), where the context Γ is only used to extract the static
part of module values. Open term values and module values are as below.
v := x | ⋆ | n | λx : τ.e | 〈v, v〉 | Λα : k.e Term values
| pack[c, v] as ∃α : k.τ
V := m | ⋆ | (|c|) | 〈|v|〉 | 〈V, V 〉 Module values
| λgnα/m : σ.M | λapα/m : σ.M
In the tstep fix rule, λ : unit.fixτe means that the term variable bound by λ is a fresh variable. To be precise, the variable
must not be in dom(Γ), and in addition it should be canonically chosen, to maintain strict determinacy of evaluation. In Crary’s
deBruin representation this is automatic.
We use V,W as metavariables for module values. We write e ↓ when the evaluation of e terminates. Similarly, we have
M ↓.
8Notice that in Example C.1, we have M = 〈(|int|), 〈〈|0|〉, 〈|λx : int.e|〉〉〉 and σO = Σα : (|T|).Σβ : 〈|α|〉.〈|α→ τf |〉. From the static semantics, we can
also derive that ⊢P M : σO . Here, to simplify the presentation, we have M = 〈(|int|), 〈|0|〉〉 and σO = Σα : (|T|).〈|α|〉
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TSTEP APP1
Γ ⊢ e1 _ e
′
1
Γ ⊢ e1 e2 _ e
′
1 e2
TSTEP APP2
Γ ⊢ e2 _ e
′
2
Γ ⊢ v1 e2 _ v1 e
′
2
TSTEP APP3
Γ ⊢ (λx : τ.e1) v2 _ e1[x 7→ v2]
TSTEP PAIR1
Γ ⊢ e1 _ e
′
1
Γ ⊢ 〈e1, e2〉 _ 〈e
′
1, e2〉
TSTEP PAIR2
Γ ⊢ e2 _ e
′
2
Γ ⊢ 〈v1, e2〉 _ 〈v1, e
′
2〉
TSTEP PI11
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ π1e _ π1e
′
TSTEP PI12
Γ ⊢ π1〈v1, v2〉 _ v1
TSTEP PI21
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ π2e _ π2e
′ TSTEP PI22 Γ ⊢ π2〈v1, v2〉 _ v2
TSTEP PAPP1
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ e[c] _ e′[c]
TSTEP PAPP2
Γ ⊢ (Λα : k.e)[c] _ e[α 7→ c]
TSTEP PACK
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ pack[c, e] as ∃α : k.τ _ pack[c, e′] as ∃α : k.τ
TSTEP UNPACK1
Γ ⊢ e1 _ e
′
1
Γ ⊢ unpack[α, x] = e1 in e2 _ unpack[α, x] = e
′
1 in e2
TSTEP UNPACK2
Γ ⊢ unpack[α, x] = (pack[c, v] as ∃α : k.τ) in e2 _
e[α 7→ c, x 7→ v]
TSTEP FIX
Γ ⊢ fixτ e _ e (λ : unit.fixτe)
TSTEP LETT1
Γ ⊢ e1 _ e
′
1
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in e2 _ let x = e
′
1 in e2
TSTEP LETT2
Γ ⊢ let x = v1 in e2 _ e2[x 7→ v1]
TSTEP LETM1
Γ ⊢M _ M ′
Γ ⊢ let α/m =M in e _ let α/m =M ′ in e
TSTEP LETM2
Γ ⊢ Fst(V )≫ c
Γ ⊢ let α/m = V in e _ e[α 7→ c,m 7→ V ]
TSTEP EXT1
Γ ⊢M _ M ′
Γ ⊢ Ext M _ Ext M ′
TSTEP EXT2
Γ ⊢ Ext 〈|v|〉 _ v
Fig. 20. Dynamic semantics - Terms Γ ⊢ e _ e′
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MSTEP DYN
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ 〈|e|〉 _ 〈|e′|〉
MSTEP APPGN1
Γ ⊢M1 _ M
′
1
Γ ⊢M1 M2 _ M
′
1 M2
MSTEP APPGN2
Γ ⊢M2 _ M
′
2
Γ ⊢ V1 M2 _ V1 M
′
2
MSTEP APPGN3
Γ ⊢ Fst(V2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢ (λgnα/m : σ.M1) V2 _ M1[α 7→ c2,m 7→ V2]
MSTEP APPAP1
Γ ⊢M1 _ M
′
1
Γ ⊢M1 ·M2 _ M
′
1 ·M2
MSTEP APPAP2
Γ ⊢M2 _ M
′
2
Γ ⊢ V1 ·M2 _ V1 ·M
′
2
MSTEP APPAP3
Γ ⊢ Fst(V2)≫ c2
Γ ⊢ (λapα/m : σ.M1) V2 _ M2[α 7→ c2,m 7→ V2]
MSTEP PAIR1
Γ ⊢M1 _ M
′
1
Γ ⊢ 〈M1,M2〉 _ 〈M
′
1,M2〉
MSTEP PAIR2
Γ ⊢M2 _ M
′
2
Γ ⊢ 〈V1,M2〉 _ 〈V1,M
′
2〉
MSTEP PI11
Γ ⊢M _ M ′
Γ ⊢ π1M _ π1M
′
MSTEP PI12
Γ ⊢ π1〈V1, V2〉 _ V1
MSTEP PI21
Γ ⊢M _ M ′
Γ ⊢ π2M _ π2M
′ MSTEP PI22 Γ ⊢ π2〈V1, V2〉 _ V2
MSTEP UNPACK1
Γ ⊢ e _ e′
Γ ⊢ unpack[α, x] = e in (M : σ) _
unpack[α, x] = e′ in (M : σ)
MSTEP UNPACK2
Γ ⊢ unpack[α, x] = (pack[c, v] as ∃α : k.τ) in (M : σ) _
M [α 7→ c, x 7→ v]
MSTEP LETT1
Γ ⊢ e1 _ e
′
1
Γ ⊢ let x = e1 in M2 _ let x = e
′
1 in M2
MSTEP LETT2
Γ ⊢ let x = v1 in M2 _ M2[x 7→ v1]
MSTEP LETM1
Γ ⊢M1 _ M
′
1
Γ ⊢ let α/m = M1 in (M2 : σ) _ let α/m =M
′
1 in (M2 : σ)
MSTEP LETM2
Γ ⊢ Fst(V )≫ c
Γ ⊢ let α/m = V in (M : σ) _ M [α 7→ c,m 7→ V ]
MSTEP SEAL
Γ ⊢ (M :> σ) _ M
Fig. 21. Dynamic semantics - Modules Γ ⊢M _ M ′
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B. Logical relation
In order to define logical relation, we define some auxiliary notions as in [9] Given a relation R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′), Rs contains
continuations that agree on values related by R. Conversely, given a relation S on continuations, related continuations by S
agree on terms in St. From s and t, we define Pitts closed relations.
Definition C.5 (Closure). For R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′), define
Rs , {〈v : τ → unit, v′ : τ → unit〉 | ∀〈w,w′〉 ∈ R : vw ↓⇔ v′w′ ↓}.
For S ∈ Rel(τ → unit, τ ′ → unit), define St , {〈w : τ, w′ : τ〉 | ∀〈v, v′〉 ∈ S, vw ↓⇔ v′w′ ↓}.
For R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′), define
Rev , {〈e : τ, e′ : τ ′〉 | e ↓⇔ e′ ↓, ∀v, v′.e _∗ v =⇒ e′ _∗ v′ =⇒ 〈v, v′〉 ∈ R}
Relation R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′) is Pitts closed if R = Rst.
We have similar definitions for relations defined on closed signatures σ1 and σ2, where the signatures for continuations are
Πgnα : σ1.1 and Π
gnα : σ2.1, which can be abbreviated as σ1 → 1 and σ2 → 1.
Apropos the stev closure, we may be able to infer indirectly that two terms are related by Rstev when these two terms
depend on terms related by Qstev.
Definition C.6. Suppose x : ̺ ⊢ e : τ . We say that x is active in e if for all closed e′ s.t. ⊢ e′ : ̺, e[x 7→ e′] ↓ implies e′ ↓.
Lemma C.7. Suppose Q ∈ Rel(̺1, ̺2), R ∈ Rel(τ1, τ2), x : ̺i ⊢ ei : τi, and x is active in e1 and e2. If for all 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Q,
〈e1[x 7→ v1], e2[x 7→ v2]〉 ∈ Rstev, then
∀〈e′1, e
′
2〉 ∈ Q
stev.〈e1[x 7→ e
′
1], e2[x 7→ e
′
2]〉 ∈ R
stev.
From [9] and Lemma wf mr in [49], we have the following lemma about properties of logical interpretations of constructors,
kinds and signatures.
Lemma C.8. Suppose that ⊢ Γ ok and 〈ρ, ρ′〉 ∈ [[Γ]]. Then
• If Γ ⊢ c : k, then 〈ρL(c), ρR(c), [[c]]ρ, [[c]]ρ′ 〉 ∈ [[k]]ρ.
• If Γ ⊢ k1 ≡ k2, then [[k1]]ρ = [[k2]]ρ
• If Γ ⊢ σ : sig, then [[σ]]ρ = [[σ]]ρ′ .
• If Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig, then [[σ]]ρ = [[σ′]]ρ.
a) Precandiate.: As in [9], we next present simple kinds which are used in the definitions of logical interpretations of
dependent kinds. A simple kind is a kind that does not have singleton kinds. Given a kind k, simp(k) returns a simple kind
by replacing singleton kinds in k with T. A candidate of a kind is a pre-candidate which is in an interpretation of a kind. We
use Q as a meta-variable for pre-candidates in general, Φ for pre-candidates over function kinds, P for pre-candidates over
pair kinds, and R for pre-candidates over T.
Val , {v | ∃τ. ⊢ v : τ}
Con , {c | ∃k. ⊢ c : k}
PreCandT , P(Val× Val)
PreCand1 , {〈〉}
PreCandk1→k2 , Con× Con× PreCandk1 → PreCandk2
PreCandk1×k2 , PreCandk1 × PreCandk2
b) Logical interpretations for kinds and constructors.: Following [9], we generalize ρ presented in §IV to a mapping that
maps constructor variables to tuples of the form 〈c, c′, Q〉, term variables to tuples of the form 〈v, v′〉, and module variables
to tuples of the form 〈V, V ′〉. Notice that in the simple language, for any α ∈ dom(ρ), ρ(α) = R ∈ Rel(τ1, τ2) for some τ1
and τ2. If we use the notation in this section, then we have that ρ(α) = 〈τ1, τ2, R〉. We write ρL and ρR for the substitutions
that map every variable in the domain of ρ to respectively the first element and the second element of the tuple that ρ maps
that variable to. If we do not have module variables, then, ρL( ) is similar to δ1γ1( ) and ρR( ) is similar to δ2γ2( ) in §IV,
where δ1 and δ2 are type substitutions in ρ, and γ1 and γ2 are term substitutions in ρ.
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[[T]]ρ , {〈τ, τ
′, R,R〉 | ⊢ τ, τ ′ : T, R ∈ Rel(τ, τ ′), R Pitts closed}
[[S(c)]]ρ , {〈τ, τ, [[c]]ρ, [[c]]ρ〉 | ⊢ τ ≡ ρL(c) : T,⊢ τ
′ ≡ ρR(c) : T, [[c]]ρ ∈ Rel(τ, τ
′), [[c]]ρ Pitts closed}
[[Πα : k1.k2]]ρ , {〈c, c
′,Φ,Φ′〉 | ⊢ c : ρL(Πα : k1.k2),⊢ c
′ : ρR(Πα : k1.k)2),
Φ,Φ′ ∈ PreCandsimp(Πα:k1.k2),
∀d, d′, Q,Q′, d′′, d′′′.Q,Q′ ∈ PreCandsimp(k1) =⇒
〈d, d′, Q,Q′〉 ∈ [[k1]]ρ =⇒
⊢ d ≡ d′′ : ρL(k1) =⇒ ⊢ d
′ ≡ d′′′ ∈ ρR(k1) =⇒
〈cd, c′d′,Φ(d, d′, Q),Φ′(d′′, d′′′, Q′)〉 ∈ [[k2]]ρ,α7→〈d,d′,Q〉}
[[Σα : k1.k2]]ρ , {〈c, c
′, P, P ′〉 | ⊢ c : ρL(Σα : k1.k2),⊢ c
′ : ρR(Σα : k1.k2),
P, P ′ ∈ PreCandsimp(Σα:k1.k2)
〈π1c, π1c
′, π1P, π1P
′〉 ∈ [[k1]]ρ,
〈π2c, π2c
′, π2P, π2P
′〉 ∈ [[k2]]ρ,α7→〈pi1c,pi1c′,pi1P 〉}
[[1]]ρ , {〈c, c
′, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 | ⊢ c : 1,⊢ c′ : 1}
[[k]]setρ , {〈c, c
′, Q〉 | 〈c, c′, Q,Q〉 ∈ [[k]]ρ}
[[α]]ρ , Q, where ρ(α) = 〈c, c
′, Q〉 [[λα : k.c]]ρ , λ〈d, d
′, Q〉 ∈ [[k]]setρ .[[c]]ρ,α7→〈d,d′ ,Q〉
[[c1c2]]ρ , [[c1]]ρ〈ρL(c2), ρR(c2), [[c2]]ρ〉 [[〈c1, c2〉]]ρ , 〈[[c1]]ρ, [[c2]]ρ〉
[[πic]]ρ , πi[[c]]ρ [[⋆]]ρ , 〈〉
[[unit]]ρ , {〈⋆, ⋆〉}
[[int]]ρ , {〈v, v〉 | ⊢ v : int}
[[τ1 → τ2]]ρ , {〈v1, v2〉 | ⊢ v1 : ρL(τ1 → τ2),⊢ v2 : ρR(τ1 → τ2),∀〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ.〈v1v
′
1, v2v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]
ev
ρ }
[[τ1 × τ2]]ρ , {〈〈v1, v2〉, 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉〉 | ⊢ 〈v1, v2〉 : ρL(τ1 × τ2), ⊢ 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉 : ρR(τ1 × τ2),
〈v1, v
′
1〉 ∈ [[τ1]]ρ, 〈v2, v
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ2]]ρ}
[[∀α : k.τ ]]ρ , {〈v, v
′〉 | ⊢ v : ρL(∀α : k.τ ), ⊢ v
′ : ρR(∀α : k.τ ),
∀〈c, c′, Q〉 ∈ [[k]]setρ .〈v[c], v
′[c′]〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ[α7→〈c,c′,Q〉]}
[[∃α : k.τ ]]ρ , {〈v, v
′〉 | ⊢ v : ρL(∃α : k.τ ),⊢ v
′ : ρR(∃α : k.τ ),
∃〈c, c′, Q〉 ∈ [[k]]setρ , ∃v0, v
′
0, k
′, k′′, τ ′, τ ′′.
v = pack[c, v0] as ∃α : k
′.τ ′, v′ = pack[c′, v′0] as ∃α : k
′′.τ ′′,
〈v0, v
′
0〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ,α7→〈c,c′,Q〉}
st
Fig. 22. Logical interpretation (kinds and constructors)
Logical interpretations for kinds and constructors are presented in Fig. 22 9. The interpretation of a kind k is a tuple
〈c, c′, Q,Q′〉 where c and c′ are closed constructors of the kind k, and Q and Q′ are candidates relating c and c′. Notice that
since pre-candidates are defined only for simple kinds, in the logical interpretations of Πα : k1.k2 and Σα : k1.k2, we use
respectively PreCandsimp(Πα:k1.k2) and PreCandsimp(Σα:k1.k2). In addition, in the definition for Πα : k1.k2, since Φ and Φ
′ are
pre-candidates of simp(Πα : k1.k2), we require that Q and Q
′ are pre-candidates of simp(k1)
10. The definitions for types of
T (e.g. τ1 → τ2) are similar to the ones of the simple language.
c) Logical interpretations for signatures.: Logical interpretations for signatures are presented in Fig. 23. The logical
interpretation of a signature σ of modules is a set of 〈V1, V2, Q〉 where the dynamic values in V1 and V2 are related at their
types, and the static part (constructors) are related by Q. For example, we consider the signature Σα : (|k|).〈|τ |〉. The logical
interpretation of this signature with a ρ is a set of 〈〈V1, V ′1〉, 〈V2, V
′
2〉, 〈P, P
′〉〉 where (1) V1 = (|c|), V2 = (|c′|) for some c and
c′ s.t. 〈c, c′, P, P 〉 ∈ [[k]]η; and (2) V2 = 〈|v|〉, V ′2 = 〈|v
′|〉 for some v and v′ s.t. 〈v, v′〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ (from the definition of [[〈|τ |〉]]ρ
we also know that P ′ = 〈〉).
Definition C.9. We say that 〈ρ, ρ′〉 ∈ [[Γ]] if whenever Γ(α) = k, there exists ρ(α) = 〈c1, c2, Q〉 and ρ′(α) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉 s.t.
⊢ c1 ≡ c′1 : ρL(k), ⊢ c2 ≡ c
′
2 : ρR(k), and 〈c1, c2, Q,Q
′〉 ∈ [[k]]ρ,
9The presentation of logical interpretations here is similar to the one in [9]. Notice that we can write definitions of logical interpretations in the form of
inference rules as in §IV.
10Notice that from definition of PreCandΠα:k1.k2 , we have that Φ〈d, d
′, Q〉 and Φ〈d′′, d′′′, Q′〉 are in PreCandsimp(k2).
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[[1]]ρ , {〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉}
[[(|k|)]]ρ , {〈(|c|), (|c
′|), Q〉 | 〈c, c′, Q〉 ∈ [[k]]setρ }
[[〈|τ |〉]]ρ , {〈〈|v|〉, 〈|v
′|〉, 〈〉〉 | ⊢ v : ρL(τ ),⊢ v : ρR(τ ), 〈v, v
′〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ}
[[Πgnα : σ1.σ2]]ρ , {〈V, V
′, 〈〉〉 | ⊢I V : ρL(Π
gnα : σ1.σ2),⊢I V
′ : ρR(Π
gnα : σ1.σ2),
∀〈W,W ′, Q〉 ∈ [[σ1]]ρ.〈VW,V
′W ′〉 ∈ [[σ2]]
iev
ρ,α7→〈Fst(W ),Fst(W ′),Q〉}
[[Πapα : σ1.σ2]]ρ , {〈V, V
′,Φ〉 | ⊢I V : ρL(Π
apα : σ1.σ2),⊢I V
′ : ρR(Π
apα : σ1.σ2),
〈Fst(V ),Fst(V ′),Φ〉 ∈ [[Fst(Πapα : σ1.σ2)]]
set
ρ ,
∀〈W,W ′, Q〉 ∈ [[σ1]]ρ.〈V ·W,V
′ ·W ′〉 ∈ [[σ2]]
pev
ρ,α7→〈Fst(W ),Fst(W ′),Q〉}
[[Σα : σ1.σ2]]ρ , {〈V, V
′, P 〉 | ⊢I V : ρL(Σα : σ1.σ2),⊢I V
′ : ρR(Σα : σ1.σ2),
∃V1, V
′
1 , V2, V
′
2 .V = 〈V1, V2〉, V
′ = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 〉, 〈V1, V
′
1 , π1P 〉 ∈ [[σ1]]ρ,
〈V2, V
′
2 , π2P 〉 ∈ [[σ2]]ρ,α7→〈Fst(V1),Fst(V ′1 ),pi1P 〉}
[[σ]]pevρ , {〈M,M
′, Q〉 | ⊢P M : ρL(σ), ⊢P M
′ : ρR(σ), M ↓⇔M
′ ↓,
∀V, V ′.M _∗ V =⇒ M ′ _∗ V ′ =⇒ 〈V, V ′, Q〉 ∈ [[σ]]ρ}
[[σ]]iρ , {〈V, V
′〉 | ∃Q.〈V, V ′, Q〉 ∈ [[σ]]ρ}
st
Fig. 23. Logical interpretation (signatures)
We say that ρ ∈ [[Γ]]full if 〈ρ, ρ〉 ∈ [[Γ]] and
• for all x : τ ∈ Γ, there exists ρ(x) = 〈v1, v2〉 s.t. 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ,
• for all α/m : σ ∈ Γ, there exists ρ(m) = 〈V1, V2〉 and ρ(α) = 〈Fst(V1),Fst(V2), Q〉 s.t. 〈V1, V2, Q〉 ∈ [[σ]]ρ.
Terms e and e′ are logically equivalent at τ in Γ (written as Γ ⊢ e ∼ e′ : τ ) if ⊢ Γ ok implies Γ ⊢ e, e′ : τ , and for
all ρ ∈ [[Γ]]full, 〈ρL(e), ρR(e′)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρ . Notice that equivalence holds vacuously, if Γ is not well formed, but we are never
interested in such Γ.
Theorem C.10 (Abstraction theorem). Suppose that ⊢ Γok. If Γ ⊢ e : τ , then Γ ⊢ e ∼ e : τ .
In [9], there are similar results for pure modules and impure modules. Later we express security in terms of sealed modules,
but our security proof only relies on the abstraction theorem for expressions.
APPENDIX D
TRNI FOR THE MODULE CALCULUS
This section recapitulates the development of §V but using an encoding suited to the module calculus. The free theorem
that typing implies security (Theorem VII.1) is formulated for an open term in context of the public view, as in Theorem V.10.
We then develop a “wrapper” to encapsulate the typing problem in a closed form. That could facilitate use of an unmodified
ML compiler without recourse to an API for the typechecker.
A. Local policy encoding
In this section, we present the encoding for local policies by using the module calculus. Here, a declassification function
or an action can be written in the module calculus with recursive functions. However, for simplicity and for coherent policy,
we assume—as in §III—that the applications of declassifiers on confidential input values always terminate. In §V, a view is a
typing context that declares variables for inputs and for declassifiers. Here, those are gathered in a signature and the view is
a context that declares a module of that signature.
Let L ⊆ VP be a finite list of distinct confidential input variables from VP . An empty list is []. We write x :: L to
concatenate a confidential input variable to L. In §V we define operations 〈〈−〉〉C and 〈〈−〉〉P that apply to policy variables
and declasifiers, yielding the encoding of policy as typing contexts. Here we use the same notation, but apply the operations
to variable lists and encode policy as signatures. First, we define 〈〈L〉〉C to return a transparent signature of the policy. It is
defined inductively as described in Fig. 24. As in §V, we use fresh constructor variables with names that indicate their role
in the encoding. For a confidential input x, basically, the signature is a pair containing information about the kind of its type,
its type, and the types of associated declassifiers. For example, for x that can be declassified via f , the signature contains: (1)
the kind of the type of x: (|S(int)|), (2) the type of x: 〈|int|〉, and (3) the type of f : 〈|int→ τf |〉. When x can be declassified
via f ◦ a, in addition to these, we also have the kind of the type of the result of a which is 〈|S(int)|〉.
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〈〈L〉〉C ,


1 if L = [],
Σαx : (|S(int)|).Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C if L = x :: L
′, x 6∈ dom(FP),
Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τf |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C if L = x :: L
′, FP(x) = f ,
Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉. if L = x :: L
′, FP(x) = f ◦ a.
Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τf |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C
〈〈L〉〉P ,


1 if L = [],
Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P if L = x :: L
′, x 6∈ dom(FP),
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τf |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P if L = x :: L
′, FP(x) = f ,
Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉. if L = x :: L
′, FP(x) = f ◦ a.
Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τf |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P
Fig. 24. Transparent and opaque signatures for a policy P .
Example D.1 (Transparent signature). For POE (Example III.2), since f = λx : int.x mod 2 is of the type int → int, by
applying the third case in 〈〈−〉〉C with τf = int, we get the signature
〈〈x〉〉C = Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.1
that can be abbreviated as 〈(|S(int)|), 〈〈|int|〉, 〈〈|int→ int|〉, 1〉〉〉.
In ML it looks like
sig type t=int val x:int val f:int->int end.
For PH (Example III.3), since f = λx : int.x mod 264 is of the type int → int, by applying the last case in 〈〈−〉〉C with
τf = int, we get the signature
〈〈x〉〉C = Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ int|〉.1
that can be abbreviated to 〈(|S(int)|), 〈(|S(int)|), 〈〈|int|〉, 〈〈|int→ int|〉, 〈〈|int→ int|〉, 1〉〉〉〉〉.
We overload 〈〈L〉〉P to get an opaque signature of the policy. The idea is similar to 〈〈L〉〉C , except that here we use constructor
variables of the T kind for types of confidential inputs and in types of declassification functions and actions. The definition is
described in Fig. 24.
Example D.2 (Opaque signature). For POE (Example III.2), since f = λx : int.xmod 2 is of the type int→ int, by applying
the third case in 〈〈−〉〉P with τf = int, we get the signature
〈〈x〉〉P = Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → int|〉.1
that can be abbreviated as Σαf : (|T|).〈〈|αf |〉, 〈〈|αf → int|〉, 1〉〉. In ML it looks like
sig type t val x:t val f: t->int end.
For PH (Example III.3), since f = λx : int.x mod 264 is of the type int → int, by applying the last case of 〈〈−〉〉P with
τf = int, we get the signature
〈〈x〉〉P = Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → int|〉.1
that can be abbreviated as Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).〈〈|αf◦a|〉, 〈〈|αf◦a → αf |〉, 〈〈|αf → int|〉, 1〉〉〉.
Hereafter, we abuse VP and use it as a list and we write σ
C
P and σP to mean respectively 〈〈VP 〉〉C and 〈〈VP 〉〉P .
In order to define TRNI, we define the confidential view and the public view as in §V. The confidential view is based on
the constructed transparent signature σCP , and the public view is based on the constructed opaque signature σP .
ΓPC , αP/mP : σ
C
P Γ
P
P , αP/mP : σP (2)
To express what in Example V.1 and Example V.2 (for POE) is written xf x, in the module calculus x is accessed as
Ext(π1(π2mPOE)) and xf is accessed as Ext(π1(π2(π2mPOE))).
From the definitions, we have that σCP and σP are closed and well-formed signatures, and σ
C
P is a subsignature of σP .
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B. TRNI
In order to define an environment ρ for the policy, we define three relations, Rx, Rf , and Rf◦a, similar to the relations
IV [[αx]], IV [[αf ]], and IV [[αf◦a]] in §V.
Rx = {〈v1, v2〉| ⊢ v1 : int, ⊢ v2 : int}
Rf = {〈v1, v2〉| ⊢ v1 : int,⊢ v2 : int, 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τf ]]
ev
∅ }
Rf◦a = {〈v1, v2〉| ⊢ v1 : int, ⊢ v2 : int, 〈f(a v1), f(a v2)〉 ∈ [[τf ]]
ev
∅ }
Notice that ∅ in [[τ ]]ev∅ is the empty environment.
Given a list L of confidential inputs from P and an environment ρ, we say that ρ ∈ |L|P when
• ρ maps mP in Γ
P
P to related module values V1 and V2 for some V1 and V2 s.t. V1 and V2 are of the transparent signature
〈〈VP 〉〉C and functions and actions in V1 and V2 are declassification functions and actions from the policy, and the
confidential values in V1 and V2 are related by Rx, Rf , or Rf◦a according to the policy, and
• ρ maps αP to a tuple 〈c1, c2, Q〉 where c1 and c2 are static parts from respectively V1 and V2, and Q depends on the
policy. That is if an element in Q is corresponding to an αx : (|T|), then this element is Rx, if an element in Q is
corresponding to an αf : (|T|), then this element is Rf , and if an element in Q is corresponding to an αf◦a : (|T|), then
this element is Rf◦a.
The definition of ρ ∈ |L|P is as below. Hereafter, we write ρ |=full P when ρ ∈ |VP |P .
Definition D.3 (full environments for P). Given L ⊆ VP , we define the set |L|P of environments by ρ ∈ |L|P iff dom(ρ) =
{αP ,mP} and
• if L = [] then ρ(mP) = 〈⋆, ⋆〉 and ρ(αP) = 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉,
• if L = x :: L′ and x 6∈ dom(FP ) then there are 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rx and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P with
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, V
′
1〉〉, 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉〉〉,
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉,
where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉 and ρ
′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉,
• if L = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f then there are 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P with
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉,
〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2 〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉,
〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉,
where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉 and ρ
′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉,
• if L = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f ◦ a then there are 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf◦a and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P with
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉〉〉,
〈(|int|), 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αP ) = 〈〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉〉〉
〈Rf◦a, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉〉〉,
where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉 and ρ
′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉.
Example D.4 (ρ |=full POE). In this example, we present a full environment for POE. We first define Rf , where f = λx :
int.xmod 2.
Rf = {〈v1, v2〉| ⊢ v1 : int,⊢ v2 : int, (v1 mod 2) =int (v2 mod 2)}.
Following the definition of ρ |=full POE, we construct ρ as below. Notice that 〈2, 4〉 ∈ Rf .
ρ(mPOE) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|2|〉, 〈〈|λx : int.xmod 2|〉, ⋆〉〉〉,
〈(|int|), 〈〈|4|〉, 〈〈|λx : int.xmod 2|〉, ⋆〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αPOE) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, ⋆〉〉〉,
〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, ⋆〉〉〉, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〉〉〉〉〉.
It follows that ρ |=full POE.
Next we prove that if τ is a type in the public view ΓPP , then all its logical interpretations are the same.
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Lemma D.5. If ρ1 |=full P , ρ2 |=full P , and ΓPP ⊢ τ : T, then [[τ ]]ρ1 = [[τ ]]ρ2 .
Therefore, we define indistinguishability based on an arbitrary ρ |=full P .
Definition D.6 (Indistinguishability). Suppose ρ and τ satisfy ρ |=full P and ΓPP ⊢ τ : T.
• Values v1 and v2 are indistinguishable at τ (written as 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[τ ]]) if 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ρ.
• Terms e1 and e2 are indistinguishable at τ (written as 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]) if 〈e1, e2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρ .
Example D.7 (Indistinguishability). We consider POE (Example III.2). As described in Example D.2, the opaque signature of
the policy is σPOE = Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → int|〉.1. Thus, the public view Γ
POE
P is αPOE/mPOE : σPOE . Notice
that since αPOE and mPOE are twinned, it follows that αPOE is of the kind Fst(σP ) = Σαf : T.Σα1 : 1.Σα2 : 1.1.
We consider the type π1αPOE . By a rule for well-formed constructors (rule ofc pi1), we have that Γ
POE
P ⊢ π1αPOE : T.
Thus, we can define indistinguishability for this type. As presented in Example D.4, ρ |=full POE. Therefore, we have that
IV [[π1αPOE ]] = [[π1αPOE ]]ρ = Rf (the definition of Rf is in Example D.4).
Next, we define TRNI for the module calculus. The definition here is similar to the one in §V.
Definition D.8 (TRNI for the module calculus). A term e is TRNI(P , τ) if ΓPC ⊢ e, and Γ
P
P ⊢ τ : T, and for all ρ |=
full P , it
follows that 〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]].
Example D.9. We consider the program e = (Ext(π1(π2(π2mPOE)))) (Ext(π1(π2mPOE))), which is corresponding to the
program xf x in Example V.11, as noted following Eqn. (2). We now check e with the definition of TRNI. We consider an
arbitrary ρ |=full POE. As described in Example D.4, ρ is as below, where 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf .
ρ(mPOE) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|λx : int.xmod 2|〉, ⋆〉〉〉,
〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|λx : int.xmod 2|〉, ⋆〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αPOE) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, ⋆〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, ⋆〉〉〉, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〉〉〉〉〉.
We have that ρL(e) = f v1 = v1 mod 2 and ρR(e) = f v2 = v2 mod 2. Since 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf , we have that (v1 mod 2) =int
(v2 mod 2). Thus, 〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ [[int]]
ev
ρ . In other words, 〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ IE [[int]]. Therefore, e is TRNI(POE, int).
C. Free theorem: typing in the public view implies security
To apply the abstraction theorem to get the free theorem, we need the following.
Lemma D.10. Suppose that ρ |=full P . It follows that ρ ∈ [[ΓPP ]]
full.
Lemma D.11. If ΓPP ⊢ e : τ , then Γ
P
C ⊢ e.
Theorem VII.1. If ΓPP ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P , τ).
Proof. Since ΓPP ⊢ e : τ , from Theorem C.10, we have that Γ
P
P ⊢ e ∼ e : τ . Thus, for any ρ ∈ [[Γ
P
P ]]
full, it follows that:
〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
ρ .
We consider an arbitrary ρ s.t. ρ |=full P . From Lemma D.10, it follows that ρ ∈ [[ΓPP ]]
full. As proven above, we have that
〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]evρ . From the definition of indistinguishability, we have that 〈ρL(e), ρR(e)〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]. In addition, since
ΓPP ⊢ e : τ , from Lemma D.11, it follows that Γ
P
C ⊢ e. Therefore, e is TRNI(P , τ).
Example D.12 (Typing implies TRNI). We consider the policy POE. As described in Example D.1 and Example D.2, the
transparent signature and the opaque signature of the policy are as below.
σCPOE = Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.1
σPOE = Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → int|〉.1
Thus, the confidential view is ΓPOEC = αPOE/mPOE : σ
C
POE
, and the public view is ΓPOEP = αPOE/mPOE : σPOE . We now look
at the program e = e1 e2, where e1 = (Ext(π1(π2(π2mPOE)))) and e2 = (Ext(π1(π2mPOE))). This program is corresponding
to the program xf x in Example V.11, as noted following definition (2). We have that Γ
POE
C ⊢ e1 : int→ int, Γ
POE
C ⊢ e2 : int,
ΓPOEP ⊢ e1 : π1αPOE → int, and Γ
POE
P ⊢ e2 : π1αPOE . Therefore, we have that Γ
POE
C ⊢ e : int, and Γ
POE
P ⊢ e : int and hence,
from Theorem VII.1, the program is TRNI(POE, int).
Similarly, we have that the expression corresponding to the program xf (xa x) in Example D.12, is well-typed in both views
of PH, and in the public view, its types is int. Thus, the program is TRNI(PH, int).
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Example D.13. The purpose of this example is similar to the one of Example V.12: to illustrate that if a program is well-typed
in the confidential view and is not TRNI(P , τ) for some τ well-formed in the public view, then the type of the program in
the public view is not equivalent to τ or the program is not well-typed in the public view.
We consider the policy POE and the program Ext(π1(π2mPOE)), which is corresponding to the program x in Example V.12.
This program is not TRNI(POE, int) since Ext(π1(π2mPOE)) itself is confidential and cannot be directly declassified. In the
public view of the policy, the type of this program is π1αPOE which is not equivalent to int.
We consider another program: e = (Ext(π1(π2mPOE))) mod 3, which is corresponding to the program x mod 3 in
Example V.12. This program is not TRNI(POE, π1αPOE) since it may map indistinguishable inputs to non-indistinguishable
outputs. For example, we consider ρ |=full POE presented in Example D.7. We have that ρL(e) = 2 mod 3 = 2, and
ρR(e) = 4 mod 3 = 1. As described in Example D.7, IV [[π1αPOE ]] = Rf = {〈v1, v2〉 | (v1 mod 2) =int (v2 mod 2)}.
Therefore 〈1, 2〉 6∈ IV [[π1αPOE ]].
As explained above, e is not TRNI(POE, π1αPOE). In the public view, it is not well-typed since the type of Ext(π1(π2mPOE))
is π1αPOE , which is not equivalent to int, and mod expects int arguments.
D. Wrapper
In this section, we will transform an open term to a closed module. We then prove that if the closed module is well-typed
in the empty context, then the original open term is well-typed in the public view and hence, e is TRNI. Thus we can use our
approach with ordinary ML implementations.
If the source programs are already parameterized by one module for their confidential inputs and their declassification
functions, then there is no need to modify source programs at all.
We next define a wrapper that wraps e with the information from the public view.
wrapP(e) , λ
gnαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉
From the construction, we have that if wrapP(e) is well-typed in the empty context, then the original term is also well-
typed in the public view. In addition, we can infer the type of the original term in the public view. These results yield, by
Theorem VII.1, that the original term is TRNI when the wrapper is well-typed.
Theorem D.14. If ⊢P wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σP .〈|τ |〉, then e is TRNI(P , τ).
Example D.15. In this example, we combine the ideas presented in §VI-B, §D-A, and §D-D to encode a complex policy
which is inspired by two-factor authentication. The policy PAut involves two confidential passwords and two declassifiers
checking1 and checking2 written in SML as below, where input1 and input2 are respectively the first input and the
second input from a user. Notice that checking2 takes a tuple of two passwords as its input.
fun checking1(password1:int) =
if (password1 = input1) then 1 else 0
fun checking2(passwords:int*int) =
if ((#1 passwords) = input1) then
if ((#2 passwords) = input2) then 1 else 0
else 2
Using the ideas presented in §VI-B, we introduce a new variable which corresponding to the tuple of two passwords.
The confidential and public signatures of PAut in the module calculus are as below, where f1 and f2 are corresponding to
checking1 and checking2.
σCPAut = Σαf1 : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.
Σαx2 : (|S(int)|).Σα3 : 〈|int|〉.
Σαf2 : (|S(int× int)|).Σα4 : 〈|int× int|〉.
Σα5 : 〈|int× int→ int|〉.1
σPAut = Σαf1 : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf1 |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf1 → int|〉.
Σαx2 : (|T|).Σα3 : 〈|αx2 |〉.
Σαf2 : (|T|).Σα4 : 〈|αf2 |〉.
Σα5 : 〈|αf2 → int|〉.1
The confidential and public signatures of PAut in SML are as below.
33
signature traSIG=sig
type t1 = int
val password1:t1
val checking1:t1->int
type t2 = int
val password2:t2
type t3 = int * int
val passwords:t3
val checking2:t3 ->int
end
signature opaSIG=sig
type t1
val password1:t1
val checking1:t1->int
type t2
val password2:t2
type t3
val passwords:t3
val checking2:t3->int
end
As in §VI-B, we require that for ρ |=full PAut, ρL and ρR are consistent. That is when ρL(mPAut) = VL, then
VL.passwords = 〈VL.password1, VL.password2〉 (and we have a similar requirement for ρR). In order to define
indistinguishability for PAut, we need to define ρ |=full PAut 11, and hence, we define Rf1 , Rx2 , Rf2 as below.
Rf1 = {〈v1, v
′
1〉 | ⊢ v1, v
′
1 : int,
v1 = v
′
1 = input1 ∨
(v1 6= input1 ∧ v
′
1 6= input1)}
Rx2 = {〈v1, v
′
1〉 | ⊢ v2, v
′
2 : int}
Rf2 = {〈〈v1, v2〉, 〈v
′
1, v
′
2〉〉 | ⊢ v1, v
′
1, v2, v
′
2 : int
(v1 = v
′
1 = input1 ∧ v2 = v
′
2 = input2) ∨
(v1 = v
′
1 = input1 ∧ v2 6= input2∧
v′2 6= input2) ∨
(v1 6= input1 ∧ v
′
1 6= input1)}
By using the wrapper presented in above, we can check that programs mPAut .checking2 mPAut .passwords and
mPAut .checking1 mPAut .password1 are TRNI(PAut, int), where mPAut is the module variable in confidential and public
views of PAut.
Remark D.16 (On wrapper). We may choose an applicative functor for wrapping the original program. However, w.r.t. this
choice, we need to handle more cases in proofs. Thus, we choose a generative functor.
APPENDIX E
PROOFS FOR TRNI FOR THE MODULE CALCULUS
A. Properties of the encoding
Lemma E.1. For any L ⊆ VP , it follows that ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉C : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L. We have four cases.
Case 1: L = []. We have that 〈〈VP 〉〉C = 1. From the ofs one rule, it follows that ⊢ 1 : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L′, x 6∈ dom(FP ). We have that 〈〈L〉〉C = Σαx : (|S(int)|).Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C .
From IH, we have that ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C : sig. Thus, we have the following derivation. Notice that Fst(〈|c|〉) = 1 for any c and
Fst((|S(int)|)) = S(int)
11Notice that as noted in the main text, ρL and ρR are consistent
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OFS SIGMA
OFS STAT
OFK SING
OFC INT
⊢ int : T
⊢ S(int) : kind
⊢ (|S(int)|) : sig
OFS SIGMA
OFS DYN
OFC INT
αx : S(int) ⊢ int : T
αx : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 : sig
⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C : sig (from IH)
αx : S(int), α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig (Lem. C.4)
αx : S(int) ⊢ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
⊢ Σαx : (|S(int)|).Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Case 3: L = x :: L′, FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int → τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉C = Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 :
〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C .
We now look at Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C . Notice that since ⊢ f : int → τ , we have that ⊢ int → τ : T. From the ofs dyn
rule, ⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 : sig. Thus, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 : sig
⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C : sig (from IH)
α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig (Lem. C.4)
⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig (Lem. C.4)
In addition, by using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 2, we have:
• ⊢ (|S(int)|) : sig,
• αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 : sig.
Therefore, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
⊢ (|S(int)|) : sig
OFS SIGMA
αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 : sig αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C
Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Case 4: L = x :: L′, FP (x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int→ τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉C = Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 :
〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C .
By using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 3, we have that ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C :
sig. From Lemma C.4, we have that αf◦a : S(int), αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C : sig.
Thus, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
αf◦a : S(int) ⊢ (|S(int)|) : sig αf◦a : S(int), αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C
αf◦a : S(int) ⊢ Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int → int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Therefore,
OFS SIGMA
⊢ (|S(int)|) : sig αf◦a : S(int) ⊢ Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
⊢ Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Lemma E.2. For any L ⊆ VP , it follows that ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L. We have four cases.
Case 1: L = []. We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = 1. From the ofs one rule, we have that ⊢ 1 : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L′, x 6∈ dom(FP). We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P . We have the following derivation.
Notice that Fst(〈|c|〉) = 1 for any c, and Fst((|T)|)) = T.
OFS SIGMA
OFS STAT
⊢ T : kind
⊢ (|T|) : sig
OFS SIGMA
OFS DYN
OFC VAR
αx : T ⊢ αx : T
αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 : sig
⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C : sig (from IH)
αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig (Lem. C.4)
αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
⊢ Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Case 3: L = x :: L′, FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int → τ for some τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 :
〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P .
We now look at Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C . We have that αf : T ⊢ αf : T and ⊢ τ : T (notice that ⊢ f : int→ τ and hence,
⊢ int → τ : T and hence, ⊢ τ : T). From ofc arrow, we have that αf : T ⊢ αf → τ : T. From Lemma C.4, it follows that
αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ αf → τ : T. From ofs dyn αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig.
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Thus, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig
⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C : sig (from IH)
αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig (Lem. C.4)
αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
In addition, by using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 2, we have that:
• ⊢ (|T|) : sig,
• αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 : sig.
Therefore, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
⊢ (|T|) : sig
OFS SIGMA
αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 : sig αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Case 4: L = x :: L′, FP(x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int → τ for some τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf :
(|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P .
By using a reasoning similar to the one in Case 3, we have that αf◦a : T, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 :
〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C : sig. Thus, we have that:
OFS SIGMA
αf◦a : T ⊢ (|T|) : sig αf◦a : T, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C
αf◦a : T ⊢ Σαf : T.Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Therefore,
OFS SIGMA
⊢ (|T|) : sig αf◦a : T ⊢ Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
⊢ Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
Lemma E.3. For any L ⊆ VP , it follows that ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L〉〉P : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by proving that for any L, ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L〉〉P : sig. We prove this by induction on L. We have
four cases.
Case 1: L = []. We have that 〈〈L〉〉C = 〈〈L〉〉P = 1. From eqs refl, we have that ⊢ 1 ≡ 1 : sig and hence, from the subs refl
rule, it follows that ⊢ 1 ≤ 1 : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L′ and x 6∈ dom(FP ). We need to prove that ⊢ Σαx : (|S(int)|).Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σαx : (|T|).Σα :
〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉C : sig.
We first prove that αf : (|S(int)|) ⊢ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉C : sig. To this aim, we prove that αx : S(int) ⊢
〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αx|〉 : sig.
SUBS REFL
EQS DYN
EQC SYMM
EQC SINGELIM
OFC VAR
(αx : S(int))(αx) = S(int)
αx : S(int) ⊢ αx : S(int)
αx : S(int) ⊢ αx ≡ int : T
αx : S(int) ⊢ int ≡ αx : T
αx : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≡ 〈|αx|〉
αx : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αx|〉 : sig
From IH, we have that ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig. From Lemma C.4, it follows that αx : S(int), α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
In addition, from Lemma E.2, we have that ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. From Lemma C.4, it follows that αx : S(int), α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig.
Since Fst(〈|int|〉) = Fst(〈|αx|〉) = 1, we have that:
SUBS SIGMA
αx : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αx|〉 : sig αx : S(int), α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig αx : S(int), α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
αx : S(int) ⊢ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig
We next prove that ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig. From ofc int, it follows that ⊢ int : T. From subk sing t, it follows that
⊢ S(int) ≤ T : kind. From subs stat, it follows that ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig.
We now prove that αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. Indeed, we have that αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 : sig. From Lemma E.2, ⊢
〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. From Lemma C.4, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. From ofs sigma, it follows that αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig.
Thus, we have that:
SUBS SIGMA
⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig αx : S(int) ⊢ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C : sig αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
⊢ Σαx : (|S(int)|).Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P
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Case 3: L = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int→ τ for some τ . We need to prove that
⊢ Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
We first prove that αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig.
SUBS REFL
EQS DYN
EQC ARROW
EQC SYMM
EQC SINGELIM
OFC VAR
(αf : S(int))(αf ) = S(int)
αf : S(int) ⊢ αf : S(int)
αf : S(int) ⊢ αf ≡ int : T
αf : S(int) ⊢ int ≡ αf : T
EQC REFL
⊢ τ : T
⊢ τ ≡ τ : T
αf : S(int) ⊢ τ ≡ τ : T (Lem. C.4)
αf : S(int) ⊢ int→ τ ≡ αf → τ : T
α : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int → τ |〉 ≡ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig
αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig
We next prove that αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. We have that
• αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig and hence, from Lemma C.4, it follows that αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢
〈|int→ τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig,
• ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig (from IH) and hence, from Lemma C.4, it follows that αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
〈〈L′〉〉P : sig,
• ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig (from Lemma E.2) and hence, from Lemma C.4, it follows that αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig
Since Fst(〈|c|〉) = 1 for any c, we have that:
SUBS SIGMA
αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|int → τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig
αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
We have that:
• αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αf |〉 : sig (as in Case 2),
• αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig (as proven above),
• αf : S(int) ⊢ αf → τ : T. From the ofs dyn rule, αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig. From Lemma C.4, αf : S(int), α1 :
1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig.
From Lemma E.2, ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig and hence, from Lemma C.4, αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig.
Since αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig and αf : S(int), α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig, from the ofs sigma rule, it
follows that αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2.〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
Since Fst(〈|c|〉) = 1 for any c, we have that:
SUBDPR
αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αf |〉 : sig
αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig αf : S(int), α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2.〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
We have that
• ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig (as in Case 2), and
• αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig (as proven above),
• αf : T ⊢ αf → τ : T. From the ofs dyn rule, αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig. From Lemma C.4, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 :
sig.
From Lemma E.2, ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig and hence, from Lemma C.4, αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig.
Since αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig and αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig, from the ofs sigma rule, αf : T, α1 :
1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig.
Since αf : T ⊢ αf : T, from the ofs dyn rule, αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 : sig. Since αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 : sig and αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 :
〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig, from the ofs sigma rule, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
From the subs sigma rule, we have that
⊢ Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
Case 4: L = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int→ τ for some τ . We need to prove that
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⊢ Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
By using reasoning similar to the one in the proof of Case 3, we have that:
• αf◦a : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|αf◦a|〉 : sig
• αf◦a : S(int), αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ int|〉 ≤ 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉 : sig
• αf◦a : S(int), αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ τ |〉 ≤ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig.
Therefore, by using reasoning similar to the one in Case 3, we have that:
αf◦a : S(int), αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
We also have that:
• αf◦a : S(int) ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig (as in Case 3),
• αf◦a : S(int), αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig
From subs sigma, it follows that
αf : S(int) ⊢ Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
In addition, we have that:
• ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig (as in Case 3),
• αf◦a : T ⊢ Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig (since αf◦a : T, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 :
〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig and αf◦a : T ⊢ (|T|) : sig)
Therefore, it follows that
⊢ Σαf◦a : (|S(int)|).Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig.
Lemma E.4 (Pitts closure). For any x, f and a in the policy, it follows that Rx, Rf and Rf◦a are Pitts closed.
Proof. We consider Rx first. The proof of this case is trivial since any v1 and v2 s.t. ⊢ vi : int, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rx.
We next consider Rf , where ⊢ f : int→ τ . We consider x : int ⊢ f x. We have that x is active in f x. We now consider
arbitrary v1 and v2 s.t. 〈v1, v2〉 in Rf . From the definition of Rf , we have that 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ev∅ . Since ⊢ τ : T, from
Lemma C.8, we have that 〈 , , [[τ ]]∅, [[τ ]]∅〉 ∈ [[T]]∅ (notice that ∅ ∈ [[.]]
full). Therefore, [[τ ]]∅ is Pitts closed, that is [[τ ]]∅ = [[τ ]]
st
∅ .
Since 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ev∅ , it follows that 〈f v1, f v2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
stev
∅ .
We have proven that:
• x is active in f x,
• for all 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf , 〈(f x)[x 7→ v1], (f x)[x 7→ v2]〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
stev
∅ .
From Lemma C.7, for all 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ Rstf , we have that 〈f w1, f w2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
stev
∅ = [[τ ]]
ev
∅ . From the definition of Rf , we have
that 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ Rf .
We now consider Rf◦a, where ⊢ a : int→ int and ⊢ f : int→ τ . We consider x : int ⊢ f(a x). We have that x is active in
f(a x). We now consider arbitrary v1 and v2 in Rf◦a. From the definition of Rf◦a, we have that 〈f(a v1), f(a v2)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ev∅ .
As proven in Case 2, we have that [[τ ]]∅ = [[τ ]]
st
∅ . Since 〈f(a v1), f(a v2)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
∅ , it follows that 〈f(a v1), f(a v2)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
stev
∅ .
We have proven that:
• x is active in f(a x),
• for all 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf◦a, 〈(f(a x))[x 7→ v1], (f(a x))[x 7→ v2]〉 ∈ [[τ ]]stev∅ .
From Lemma C.7, for all 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ R
st
f◦a, we have that 〈f(a w1), f(a w2)〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
stev
∅ = [[τ ]]
ev
∅ . From the definition of
Rf◦a, we have that 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ Rf◦a.
Lemma E.5. For any L ⊆ VP and ρ ∈ |L|P , it follows that
• ⊢P ρL(mP) : 〈〈L〉〉C and ⊢P ρR(mP ) : 〈〈L〉〉C , and
• ⊢P ρL(mP) : 〈〈L〉〉P and ⊢P ρR(mP) : 〈〈L〉〉P .
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Proof. The first part of the Lemma E.5 is from the definition of ρ ∈ |L|P . The second part follows from the first part,
Lemma E.3, and the subsumption rule.
Lemma E.6. Suppose that L ⊆ VP , ρ ∈ |L|P , ρ(αP ) = 〈c1, c2, Q〉, k = Fst(〈〈L〉〉P ). It follows that:
• ⊢ k : kind,
• ⊢ c1 : ρL(k), ⊢ c2 : ρR(k), and
• 〈c1, c2, Q,Q〉 ∈ [[k]]ρ.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on L, using the definition of ρ ∈ |L|P .
Case 1: L = []. We have that σ = 1 and k = 1, ρ(αP) = 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉. We can easily check that ⊢ 1 : kind, ⊢ ⋆ : 1, and
〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ.
Case 2: L = x :: L′, where x 6∈ dom(FP ). We have that
• σ = Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P , and
• k = Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ),
• Q = 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉,
• ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉,
• ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , where ρ′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉.
We need to prove that:
• ⊢ Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) : kind,
• ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′2〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• 〈〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉 ∈ [[Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ.
We first prove that ⊢ Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. From IH, we have that ⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. From Lemma C.4,
α : 1 ⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. From rule ofk sigma, ⊢ Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. From Lemma C.4, αx : T ⊢ Σα :
1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. From rule ofk sigma, ⊢ Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind.
We next prove that ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )) and ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′2〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )).
Since their proofs are similar, we only prove here ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )). Notice that since
Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) is a closed kind (as proven above), we have that ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )) = Σαx :
T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ).
We have the following derivations. Notice that
• ⊢ int : T,
• if k′ is a closed kind, then k′[β 7→ c′] = k′ for any β and c′,
• ⊢ c′1 : ρ
′
L(Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )) (from IH) and hence, ⊢ c′1 : Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) (since from IH, Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) is a closed kind). Thus,
⊢ c′1 : Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )[α 7→ ⋆].
• ⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind (from IH) and hence, from Lemma C.4, α : 1 ⊢ Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) : kind,
• ⊢ Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind (from the ofk sigma rule and α : 1 ⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind) and hence αx : T ⊢ Σα :
1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind (from Lemma C.4).
OFC PAIR
⊢ ⋆ : 1 ⊢ c′1 : Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )[α 7→ ⋆] α : 1 ⊢ Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) : kind
⊢ 〈⋆, c′1〉 : Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )
OFC PAIR
⊢ int : T ⊢ 〈⋆, c′1〉 : Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )[αx 7→ int] αx : T ⊢ Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) : kind
⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉 : Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )
We now prove that 〈〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉 ∈ [[Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ. As proven above, we have
that ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉 : ρL(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )) and ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉 : ρR(Σαx : T.Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )). We now need
to prove that:
• 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉 ∈ PreCandsimp(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• 〈int, int, Rx, Rx〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ,
• ⊢ 〈⋆, c′1〉 : ρ1L(Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• ⊢ 〈⋆, c′2〉 : ρ1R(Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ1
• ⊢ c′1 : ρ2L(Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• ⊢ c′2 : ρ2R(Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )),
• 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ))]]ρ2 ,
where ρ1 = ρ, αx 7→ 〈int, int, Rx〉 and ρ2 = ρ1, α 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉.
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We have that:
• We have that Rx ∈ PreCandT, 〈〉 ∈ PreCand1. From IH, 〈c
′
1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ and hence, Q
′ ∈
PreCandsimp(Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )) (notice that simp(Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )) = Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) since there is no singleton kind in Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )).
• From Lemma E.4, Rx = R
st
x . Thus, 〈int, int, Rx, Rx〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ.
• As shown in the first derivation in the proof above, we have that ⊢ 〈⋆, c′1〉 : Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P ) and hence, ⊢ 〈⋆, c′1〉 :
ρ1L(Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )) (since Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )) is closed)
• Similarly, it follows that ⊢ 〈⋆, c′2〉 : ρ1R(Σα : 1.Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )).
• Since L′ ⊆ VP and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , from IH, ⊢ c′1 : ρ
′
L(k
′), where ρ′ ∈ |L′|P and k′ = Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )). Also from IH, ⊢ k′.
Thus, ⊢ c′1 : k
′ and hence, ⊢ c′1 : ρ2L(k
′).
• Similarly, ⊢ c′1 : ρ2R(k
′).
• Since L′ ⊆ VP and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , from IH, 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ′ , where ρ′ ∈ |L′|P . Also from IH,
⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. Since 〈ρ′, ρ2〉 ∈ [[.]], from Lemma C.8, we have that [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ′ = [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ2 . Therefore,
〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ2 .
Case 3: L = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int → τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαf : (|T|).α1 : 〈|αf |〉.α2 :
〈|αf → τf |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P , k = Σαf : T.α1 : 1.α2 : 1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ), and ρ′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉, and
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉,
As in Case 2, we have that ⊢ k : kind and ⊢ 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c′1〉〉〉 : k. We now prove that 〈c1, c2, Q,Q〉 ∈ [[Σαf : T.α1 : 1.α2 :
1.Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ. That is we need to prove that:
• 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q′〉〉〉 ∈ PreCandsimp(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• 〈int, int, Rf , Rf 〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ,
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ1 , where ρ1 = ρ, αf 7→ 〈int, int, Rf〉,
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ2 , where ρ2 = ρ1, α1 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉,
• 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ3 , where ρ3 = ρ2, α2 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉.
The first item can be easily verified (as in Case 2). From Lemma E.4, Rf is Pitts closed and hence, 〈int, int, Rf , Rf 〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ.
We can easily verify that 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ1 and 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ2 .
We have that L′ ⊆ VP and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P (since ρ ∈ |L|P), from IH, we have that 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ′ . Also from
IH, we have that ⊢ Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) : kind. Since 〈ρ
′, ρ3〉 ∈ [[.]], from Lemma C.8, we have that [[Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )]]ρ′ = [[Fst(〈〈L
′〉〉P )]]ρ3 .
Therefore, we have that 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ3 .
Case 4: L = x :: L′ and FP (x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int → τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαf◦a : (|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 :
〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τf |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P , k = Σαf◦a : T.Σαf : T.Σα1 : 1.Σα2 : 1.Σα3 : 1.〈〈L
′〉〉P , ρ
′(αP ) =
〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉, and
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉〉〉
〈Rf◦a, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉〉〉,
The proofs for the first two parts of the lemma for this case are similar to the ones of Case 2. For the last part, we need to
prove that
• 〈Rf◦a, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q′〉〉〉〉〉 ∈ PreCandsimp(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• 〈int, int, Rf◦a, Rf◦a〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ,
• 〈int, int, Rf , Rf 〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ1 , where ρ1 = ρ, αf◦a 7→ 〈int, int, Rf◦a〉,
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ2 , where ρ2 = ρ1, αf 7→ 〈int, int, Rf 〉,
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ3 , where ρ3 = ρ2, α1 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉,
• 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[1]]ρ4 , where ρ4 = ρ3, α2 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉,
• 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′, Q′〉 ∈ [[Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P )]]ρ5 , where ρ5 = ρ4, α3 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉.
These items can be proven by using IH (notice that L′ ⊆ VP and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P ), Lemma E.4, Lemma C.8, and interpretations
of kinds as in Case 2 and Case 3.
Lemma D.5 [§VII] If ρ1 |=full P , ρ2 |=full P , and ΓPP ⊢ τ : T, then [[τ ]]ρ1 = [[τ ]]ρ2 .
Proof. From the definition of ρi ∈ |VP |P , we have that ρ1(αP) = ρ2(αP) = 〈c1, c2, Q〉 for some c1, c2, and Q. From
Lemma E.6 and the definition of constructor equivalence, we have that:
• ⊢ c1 ≡ c1 : ρ1L(Fst(σP )), ⊢ c2 ≡ c2 : ρ1R(Fst(σP ))), and
• 〈c1, c2, Q,Q〉 ∈ [[Fst(σP ))]]ρ1 .
In other words, 〈ρ1, ρ2〉 ∈ [[αP/mP : σP ]].
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Since ΓPP ⊢ τ : T, from Lemma C.8, we have that 〈 , , [[τ ]]ρ1 , [[τ ]]ρ2 〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ1 . From the definition of [[T]]ρ (see Fig. 22), it
follows that [[τ ]]ρ1 = [[τ ]]ρ2 .
Lemma D.10 [§VII]. Suppose that ρ |=full P . It follows that ρ ∈ [[ΓPP ]]
full.
Proof. We need to prove that ρ |=full [[αP/mP : 〈〈VP 〉〉P ]]. We claim that for any L ⊆ VP and any ρ ∈ |L|P , it follows that
ρ |=full [[αP/mP : 〈〈L〉〉P ]]. Then the proof follows directly from the claim.
We now prove the claim. Suppose that ρ(αP) = 〈c1, c2, Q〉 and ρ(mP) = 〈V1, V2〉. From Lemma E.6, we have that:
• ⊢ c1 : ρL(k), ⊢ c2 : ρR(k) where k = Fst(〈〈L〉〉P ), and hence, it follows that ⊢ c1 ≡ c1 : ρL(k) and ⊢ c2 ≡ c2 : ρR(k)
• 〈c1, c2, Q,Q〉 ∈ [[k]]ρ.
Therefore, 〈ρ, ρ〉 ∈ [[αP/mP : 〈〈L〉〉P ]]. Thus, we only need to prove two following items:
• ρ(αP) = 〈Fst(V1),Fst(V2), Q〉,
• 〈V1, V2, Q〉 ∈ [[〈〈L〉〉P ]]ρ.
We prove these two items by induction on L, using the definition of ρ ∈ |L|P . We have four cases.
Case 1: L = []. We have that σ = 〈〈L〉〉P = 1, ρ(mP ) = 〈⋆, ⋆〉 and ρ(αP) = 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉. In other words, V1 = V2 = ⋆ and
Q = 〈〉. Since ⊢ Fst(⋆)≫ ⋆, from the definition of [[1]]ρ, we have that 〈V1, V2, Q〉 ∈ [[σ]]ρ.
Case 2: L = x :: L′, x 6∈ dom(FP ). We have that:
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, V
′
1〉〉, 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉〉〉,
ρ(αP ) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉,
and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rx, and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉, ρ
′(αP) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉. We also have that ρ = Σαx : (|T|).Σα :
〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P .
Since ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V2〉, ρ
′(αP ) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉, and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , from IH, we have that:
• c′1 = Fst(V
′
1 ), c
′
2 = Fst(V
′
2), and
• 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ .
Therefore, we have that Fst(V1) = 〈int, 〈⋆,Fst(V ′1 )〉〉, Fst(V2) = 〈int, 〈⋆,Fst(V
′
2 )〉〉. In other words, ρ(αP) =
〈Fst(V1),Fst(V2), 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉.
We now need to prove that 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, V ′1 〉〉, 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉〉, 〈Rx, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉 ∈ [[Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ.
From the definition of [[Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ, we need to prove that:
• ⊢I V1 : ρL(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• ⊢I V2 : ρR(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• 〈(|int|), (|int|), Rx〉 ∈ [[(|T|)]]ρ,
• 〈〈〈|v1|〉, V ′1〉, 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉 ∈ [[Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ1 , where ρ1 = ρ, αx 7→ 〈int, int, Rx〉:
– ⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, V
′
1〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P (since Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P is a closed signature),
– ⊢I 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P (since Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P is a closed signature),
– 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈|v2|〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αx|〉]]ρ1 ,
– 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ2 , where ρ2 = ρ, αx 7→ 〈int, int, Rx〉, α 7→ 〈Fst((|v
′
1|)),Fst((|v
′
2|)), 〈〉〉.
These items are proven as below.
• From Lemma E.5, ⊢P V1 : 〈〈L〉〉P and hence ⊢I V1 : 〈〈L〉〉P . From Lemma E.2, ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P : sig. Thus, ⊢I V1 : ρL(〈〈L〉〉P ).
• Similarly, we have that ⊢I V2 : ρR(〈〈L〉〉P ).
• From Lemma E.4, we have that 〈int, int, Rx, Rx〉 ∈ [[T]]ρ and hence, 〈(|int|), (|int|), Rx〉 ∈ [[(|T|)]]ρ.
• We have that ⊢P 〈|v1|〉 : 〈|int|〉. From Lemma E.5, ⊢P V
′
1 : 〈〈L
′〉〉C . Since α 6∈ FV (〈〈L′〉〉C), from the ofm pair rule,
⊢P 〈〈|v1|〉, V1〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C .
We have that ⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|int|〉 : sig, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig, and α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig. Thus,
SUBS SIGMA
⊢ 〈|int|〉 ≤ 〈|int|〉 : sig α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
⊢ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L′〉〉C ≤ Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P : sig
Since ⊢P 〈〈|v1|〉, V1〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C , from ofm subsume, ⊢P 〈〈|v1|〉, V1〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P . From the forgetful rule,
⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, V1〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P .
• Similarly, we have that ⊢I 〈〈|v2|〉, V
′
2〉 : Σα : 〈|int|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ,
• From the requirement on v1 and v2 in ρ ∈ |L|P , and the definition of [[αx]]ρ,αx 7→〈int,int,Rx〉, we have that 〈v1, v2〉 ∈
[[αx]]ρ,αx 7→〈int,int,Rx〉 and hence, 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈|v2|〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αx|〉]]ρ,αx 7→〈int,int,Rx〉 = [[〈|αx|〉]]ρ1 .
• From IH, we have that 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ . Since ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig, and 〈ρ′, ρ2〉 ∈ [[.]], from Lemma C.8, we have
that [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ = [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ2 . Therefore, we have that 〈V
′
1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ2 .
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Case 3: L = x :: L′, FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int→ τ . We have that:
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉, 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉,
and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf , and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉 and ρ
′(αP) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉. We also have that σ = Σαf :
(|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P
The proof that ρ(αP) = 〈Fst(V1),Fst(V2), Q〉 is similar to the one in Case 2. We now prove that 〈V1, V2, Q〉,∈ [[〈〈L〉〉P ]]ρ.
We need to prove that:
• ⊢I V1 : ρL(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• ⊢I V2 : ρR(〈〈L〉〉P ),
• 〈〈|int|〉, 〈|int|〉, Rf 〉 ∈ [[(|T|)]]ρ
• 〈〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V1〉〉, 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V ′2〉〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉 ∈ [[Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ1 , where ρ1 = ρ, αf 7→
〈int, int, Rf 〉
We have that:
• From Lemma E.5, ⊢P V1 : 〈〈L〉〉P and hence ⊢I V1 : 〈〈L〉〉P . From Lemma E.2, ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P : sig. Thus, ⊢I V1 : ρL(〈〈L〉〉P ).
• Similarly, we have that ⊢I V2 : ρR(〈〈L〉〉P ).
• From Lemma E.4, Rf is Pitts closed. Thus, 〈〈|int|〉, 〈|int|〉, Rf 〉 ∈ [[(|T|)]]ρ.
We now prove that
〈〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1 〉〉, 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉 ∈ [[Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ]]ρ1 .
We need to prove that:
• ⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉 : ρ1L(Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ) and hence, ⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V1〉〉 :
Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ,
• ⊢I 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉 : ρ1L(Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ) and hence, ⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V1〉〉 :
Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ,
• 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈|v2|〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αf |〉]]ρ1 ,
• 〈〈〈|f |〉, V ′1〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉 ∈ [[Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ2 , where ρ2 = ρ1, α1 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉.
We have that:
• By using similar reasoning as in Case 2, ⊢I 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉 : Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P .
• Similarly, ⊢I 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉 : Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P .
• From the definition of ρ ∈ |L|P , 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf = [[αf ]]ρ,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉. Thus, 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈|v2|〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αf |〉]]ρ,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉 =
[[〈|αf |〉]]ρ1 .
We now prove that 〈〈〈|f |〉, V ′1〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉 ∈ [[Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ]]ρ2 . We need to prove that:
• ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉 : ρ2L(Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ) and hence, ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉 : Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P (since Σα2 :
〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P is a closed signature)
• ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉 : ρ2R(Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ) and hence, ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉 : Σα2 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P
• 〈〈|f |〉, 〈|f |〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αf → τ |〉]]ρ2
• 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ3 , where ρ3 = ρ2, α2 7→ 〈⋆, ⋆, 〈〉〉.
We have that:
• By using similar reasoning as in Case 2, ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉 : ρ2L(Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P )
• Similarly, ⊢I 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉 : ρ2R(Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P )
• We consider 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ Rf . From the definition of Rf , 〈f w1, f w2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]ev∅ . Thus, we have that 〈f, f〉 ∈ [[αf → τ ]]ρ2 .
In other words, 〈〈|f |〉, 〈|f |〉, 〈〉〉 ∈ [[〈|αf → τ |〉]]ρ2 .
• We now prove 〈V ′1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ3 . From IH, 〈V
′
1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ Since 〈ρ′, ρ3〉 ∈ [[.]] and ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P : sig
(Lemma E.2), from Lemma C.8, we have that [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ′ = [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ3 . Thus, 〈V
′
1 , V
′
2 , Q
′〉 ∈ [[〈〈L′〉〉P ]]ρ3 .
Case 4: L = x :: L′, FP(x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int→ τ . We have that:
ρ(mP) = 〈〈(|int|), 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉〉〉,
〈(|int|), 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v2|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
2〉〉〉〉〉〉,
ρ(αP) = 〈〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
1〉〉〉〉〉, 〈int, 〈int, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, 〈⋆, c
′
2〉〉〉〉〉
〈Rf◦a, 〈Rf , 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, 〈〈〉, Q
′〉〉〉〉〉〉,
and 〈v1, v2〉 ∈ Rf◦a, and ρ′ ∈ |L′|P , where ρ′(mP) = 〈V ′1 , V
′
2〉, ρ
′(αP) = 〈c′1, c
′
2, Q
′〉. We also have that σ = Σαf◦a :
(|T|).Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P .
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The proof is similar to the proof of Case 3. Here, we write only the proofs of interesting parts.
• 〈a, a〉 ∈ [[αf◦a → αf ]]αf◦a 7→〈int,int,Rf◦a〉,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉,
• ⊢ 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V ′1〉〉〉〉 : ρ1L(Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ), where
ρ1 = ρ, αf◦a 7→ 〈int, int, Rf◦a〉.
We consider 〈w1, w2〉 ∈ Rf◦a. From the assumption about terminations of applications of declassifiers, a wi _∗ w′i for
some w′i. From the definition of Rf◦a, 〈f w
′
1, f w
′
2〉 ∈ [[τ ]]
ev
∅ . In other words, 〈w
′
1, w
′
2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]αf◦a 7→〈int,int,Rf◦a〉,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉.
Therefore, 〈a w1, a w2〉 ∈ [[αf ]]evαf◦a 7→〈int,int,Rf◦a〉,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉. Thus, we have that
〈a, a〉 ∈ [[αf◦a → αf ]]αf◦a 7→〈int,int,Rf◦a〉,αf 7→〈int,int,Rf 〉.
We now prove that
⊢I 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉〉 : ρ1L(Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf◦a|〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf◦a → αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ).
By applying ρ1L on the signature, we need to prove that:
⊢I 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉〉 : Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P .
We can easily prove that the module value is an impurely well-formed with the transparent signature:
⊢I 〈(|int|), 〈〈|v1|〉, 〈〈|a|〉, 〈〈|f |〉, V
′
1〉〉〉〉 : Σαf : (|S(int)|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C .
In order to apply the ofm subsume rule and then closing the proof, we need to prove that the transparent signature is the
subsignature of the desired signature:
⊢ Σαf : (|int|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P
Since ⊢ (|S(int)|) ≤ (|T|) : sig and αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P : sig, from subs sigma,
we need to prove that
αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P
Since we have αf : S(int) in the context, we have that αf : S(int) ⊢ int ≡ αf . Thus, αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ int|〉 ≡
〈|int→ αf |〉 : sig, and αf : S(int) ⊢ 〈|int→ int|〉 ≡ 〈|αf → τ |〉 : sig. By using reasoning as in the proof of Lemma E.3, we
have that
αf : S(int) ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ int|〉.Σα3 : 〈|int→ τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉C ≤
Σα1 : 〈|int|〉.Σα2 : 〈|int→ αf |〉.Σα3 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P .
B. Wrapper
Lemma E.7. If Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : σ, then σ = 〈|τ |〉 for some τ and Γ ⊢ e : τ .
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : σ. We consider the last rule applied in the derivation.
We have two cases (since other rules cannot be applied).
Case 1: Rule ofm dyn.
Γ ⊢ e : τ
Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : (|τ |)
The proof follows from the rule.
Case 2: Rule ofm subsume.
Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : σ
′ Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig
Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : σ
From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : σ
′. From IH, σ′ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ and Γ ⊢ e : τ ′. Since Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig,
from Lemma E.12, Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ σ : sig. From Lemma E.11, it follows that σ = 〈|τ |〉 for some τ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Thus,
Γ ⊢ e : τ .
Lemma D.11. If ΓPP ⊢ e : τ , then Γ
P
C ⊢ e.
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Proof. First we have that ⊢P λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉 : ΠapαP : σP .(|τ |).
OFM LAMAP
⊢ σP : sig
OFM DYN
αP ,mP : σP ⊢ e : τ
αP ,mP : σP ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : (|τ |)
⊢P λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉 : Π
apαP : σP .(|τ |)
From the weakening lemma (Lemma C.4), we have that αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉 : Π
apαP : σP .(|τ |). In
addition, we have that αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ σ
C
P ≤ σP : sig (Lemma E.3 and Lemma C.4) and αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ Fst(mP) ≫ αP .
Therefore, we have that:
OFM APPAP
αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉 : Π
apαP : σP .(|τ |) αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P m : σP αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ Fst(mP)≫ αP
αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P (λ
apαP , mP : σP .〈|e|〉) mP : (|τ |)[αP 7→ αP ]
and hence, αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P (λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉) mP : (|τ |).
Since αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ Fst(mP)≫ αP , from mstep app3,
αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ (λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉) mP _ αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ e[mP 7→ mP , αP 7→ αP ].
And thus,
αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ (λ
apαP ,mP : σP .〈|e|〉) mP : (|τ |) _ αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢ e.
From the type preservation theorem ( [48, Theorem 2.2]), we have that αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : (|τ |). From Lemma E.7, it
follows that αP ,mP : σ
C
P ⊢P e.
Lemma E.8. It follows that ⊢P VP : σ
C
P .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L.
Lemma E.9. It follows that ⊢I (VP :> σP) : σP .
Proof. From Lemma E.8, we have that ⊢P VP : σ
C
P . Since ⊢ σ
C
P ≤ σP : sig (by Lemma E.3), from the ofm subsume rule,
it follows that ⊢P VP : σP . From the ofm forget rule, we have that ⊢I VP : σP . From the ofm seal rule, we have that
⊢I (VP :> σP) : σP .
Lemma E.10. For any V , σ and σ′, if ⊢I (V :> σ) : σ
′ then ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of ⊢I V :> σ : σ
′. We consider the last rule applied in the derivation.
We have two cases.
Case 1: Rule ofm seal. From the rule, we have that σ = σ′ and hence, ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig.
Case 2: Rule ofm subsume. From the rule, we have ⊢I (V :> σ) : σ
′′ and ⊢ σ′′ ≤ σ′ : sig. Since ⊢I (V :> σ) : σ
′′, from
IH, ⊢ σ ≤ σ′′ : sig. Since ⊢ σ ≤ σ′′ : sig and ⊢ σ′′ ≤ σ′ : sig, from the subs trans rule, it follows that ⊢ σ ≤ σ′ : sig.
Lemma E.11. Suppose that Γ ⊢ τ : T. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T,
• if Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on derivation of Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig and Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig. We consider the last rule
applied. We have four cases (other rules cannot be the last rule of the derivation).
Case 1: eqs refl. From the rule, we have that σ = 〈|τ |〉. Since Γ ⊢ τ : T, from the eqc reflrule, we have that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ : T.
Case 2: eqs symm. We consider Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉. From IH, σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for
some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
We now consider Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig. From IH, σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t.
Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Case 3: eqs transWe consider Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ σ : sig.
From IH, it follows that σ′ = 〈|τ ′′|〉 for some τ ′′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. From the static semantics, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ′′ : T.
Thus, from IH, σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ′′ ≡ τ ′ : T. From the eqc trans rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
We now consider Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From IH, it
follows that σ′ = 〈|τ ′′|〉 for some τ ′′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. From the static semantics, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ′′ : T. Thus, from IH,
σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ′′ ≡ τ ′ : T. From the eqc trans rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Case 4: eqs dyn. We consider Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig first. From the rule, σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ and Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
We now consider the case Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From the rule, σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ and Γ ⊢ τ ′ ≡ τ : T. From the eqc symm
rule, it follows that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
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Lemma E.12. Suppose that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ : sig. It follows that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ : sig. We consider the last rule applied. We have
two cases (other rules cannot be the last rule in the derivation).
Case 1: subs refl. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig.
Case 2: subs trans. From the rule, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig. Since Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ′ : sig, from
IH, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ′ : sig. From Lemma E.11, σ′ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Since Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig,
we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ ′|〉 ≤ σ : sig. From IH, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ ′|〉 ≡ σ : sig. Since σ′ = 〈|τ ′|〉, it follows that Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ σ : sig.
Since Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ′ : sig, and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≡ σ : sig, we have that Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig.
Lemma E.13. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ T ≡ k : kind then k is T,
• if Γ ⊢ k ≡ T : kind then k is T,
• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ k : kind then k is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ k ≡ 1 : kind then k is 1.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ T ≡ k : kind, Γ ⊢ k ≡ T : kind, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ k : kind, and
Γ ⊢ k ≡ 1 : kind. We have three cases.
Case 1: Rule eqk refl. We consider 1 first. From the rule, we have that k is 1. The proof for T is similar.
Case 2: Rule eqk symm.
• Case Γ ⊢ T ≡ k : kind. From the rule, Γ ⊢ k ≡ T : kind. From IH, k is T.
• Case Γ ⊢ k ≡ T : kind. From the rule, Γ ⊢ T ≡ k : kind. From IH, k is T.
• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ k : kind. From the rule, Γ ⊢ k ≡ 1 : kind. From IH, k is 1.
• Case Γ ⊢ k ≡ 1 : kind. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ k : kind. From IH, k is 1.
Case 3: Rule eqk trans. The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2.
Lemma E.14. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig then σ is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 1 : sig then σ is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig then σ is (|T|),
• if Γ ⊢ σ ≡ (|T|) : sig then σ is (|T|).
Proof. We prove the two first items of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 1 : sig.
Case 1a: Rule eqs refl. From the rule, σ is 1.
Case 2a: Rule eqs symm.
• Case Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig. From the rule, Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 1 : sig. From IH, σ is 1.
• Case Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 1 : sig. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig. From IH, σ is 1.
Case 3a: Rule eqs trans. The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2a.
We prove the last two items of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig, and Γ ⊢ σ ≡ (|T|) : sig.
Case 1b: Rule eqs refl. From the rule, σ is (|T|).
Case 2b: Rule eqs symm.
• Case Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig. From the rule, Γ ⊢ σ ≡ (|T|) : sig. From IH, σ is (|T|).
• Case Γ ⊢ σ ≡ (|T|) : sig. From the rule, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig. From IH, σ is (|T|).
Case 3b: Rule eqs trans. The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2b.
Case 4b: Rule eqs stat. From the rule, σ′ = (|k′|) for some k′ s.t. Γ ⊢ T ≡ k′ : kind. From Lemma E.13, k′ is T. Thus, σ′
is (|T|).
Lemma E.15. It follows that:
• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ k : kind then k is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ T ≤ k : kind then k is T.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ ≤ k : kind. Here, we only prove the first part of the
lemma. The proof of the second part is similar.
Case 1: Rule subk refl. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ k : kind. From Lemma E.13, k is 1.
Case 2: Rule subk trans. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ k′ : kind and Γ ⊢ k′ ≤ k : kind.
Since Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ k′ : kind, from IH, k′ is 1. Since Γ ⊢ k′ ≤ k : kind and k′ is 1, from IH, we have that k is 1.
Lemma E.16. It follows that:
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• if Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig then σ is 1,
• if Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ : sig then σ is (|T|).
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig.
Case 1a: Rule subs refl. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ is 1.
Case 2a: Rule subs trans. From the rule, Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig.
Since Γ ⊢ 1 ≤ σ′ : sig, from IH, σ′ is 1. Since Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig and σ′ is 1, from IH, we have that σ is 1.
We now prove the second part of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ : sig.
Case 1b: Rule subs refl. From the rule, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ is (|T|).
Case 2b: Rule subs trans. From the rule, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig.
Since Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ′ : sig, from IH, σ′ is (|T|). Since Γ ⊢ σ′ ≤ σ : sig and σ′ is (|T|), from IH, we have that σ is (|T|).
Case 3b: Rule subs stat. From the rule, σ is k′ s.t. Γ ⊢ T ≤ k′ : kind. From Lemma E.15, k′ = T.
Lemma E.17. For any L ⊆ VP , if Γ ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≤ σ : sig for some σ, then Γ ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≡ σ : sig.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on L.
Case 1: L = []. We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = 1. Therefore, we have that ⊢ 1 ≤ σ : sig. From Lemma E.16, we have that σ is 1.
Thus, Γ ⊢ 1 ≡ σ : sig.
Case 2: L = x :: L′ where x 6∈ dom(FP). We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P . From the definition of
subsignature, σ = Σαx : σ1.Σα : σ2.σ3. Without loss of generality, we suppose that αx and α are not in dom(Γ) (we can
change the constructor variables if necessary). Therefore, we have that Γ, αx : T ok and Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ok.
Since Γ ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≤ σ : sig, from the subs sigma rule, it follows that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ1 : sig
• Γ, αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ Σα : σ2.σ3, and hence,
– Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≤ σ2 : sig
– Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ σ3 : sig
We have that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ1 : sig. From Lemma E.16, σ1 is (|T|) and hence, Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig.
• Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≤ σ2 : sig. From Lemma E.12, Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≡ σ2 : sig.
• Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ σ3 : sig. From IH, we have that Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≡ σ3 : sig.
Therefore, we have the following derivation:
EQS SIGMA
Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig
EQS SIGMA
Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≡ σ2 : sig Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ σ3 : sig
Γ, αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σα : σ2.σ3
Γ ⊢ Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σαx : σ1.Σα : σ2.σ3
Case 3: = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f , where ⊢ f : int → τ . We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 :
〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P . From the definition of subsignature, σ = Σαf : σ1.Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.〈〈L′〉〉P . Without loss of generality,
we suppose that αf , α1, and α2 are not in dom(Γ) (we can change the constructor variables if it is necessary). Therefore, we
have that Γ, αf : T ok, Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ok, and Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ok.
Since Γ ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≤ σ : sig, from the subs sigma rule, it follows that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≤ σ1 : sig
• Γ, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.σ4, and hence:
– Γ, αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 ≤ σ2 : sig
– Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ Σα2 : σ3.σ4 : sig, and hence,
∗ Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 ≤ σ3
∗ Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≤ σ4 : sig
As in Case 2, we have that:
• Γ, αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 ≡ σ2 : sig,
• Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 ≡ σ3,
• Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ σ4 : sig,
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig,
Therefore, we have the following derivations:
Γ, αf : T ⊢ 〈|αf |〉 ≡ σ2 : sig
Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ 〈|αf → τ |〉 ≡ σ3 Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1, α2 : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ σ4 : sig
Γ, αf : T, α1 : 1 ⊢ Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σα2 : σ3.σ4 : sig
Γ, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.σ4
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Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig Γ, αf : T ⊢ Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.σ4
Γ ⊢ Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L
′〉〉P ≡ Σαf : σ1.Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.σ4
Thus, we have that Γ ⊢ Σαf : (|T|).Σα1 : 〈|αf |〉.Σα2 : 〈|αf → τ |〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ≡ Σαf : σ1.Σα1 : σ2.Σα2 : σ3.σ4.
Case 4: = x :: L′ and FP(x) = f ◦ a, where ⊢ f : int→ τ . The proof is similar to the proof of Case 3.
Lemma E.18. Let σ be a signature s.t. Γ ⊢ σP ≡ σ : sig. It follows that Fst(σ) = Fst(σP).
Proof. We claim that for any L ⊆ VP and σ s.t. ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≡ σ : sig, it follows that Fst(σ) = Fst(〈〈L〉〉P ). The proof then
follows directly from the claim. We prove the claim by induction on L.
Case 1: L = []. We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = 1. Since Γ ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig, from Lemma E.14, σ = 1. From the definition of Fst(),
we have that Fst(σ) = Fst(〈〈L〉〉P ) = 1.
Case 2: L = x :: L′, where x 6∈ dom(FP ). We have that 〈〈L〉〉P = Σαx : (|T|).Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P . Since ⊢ 〈〈L〉〉P ≡ σ : sig,
from the eqs sigma rule, σ is Σαx : σ1.Σα : σ2.σ3 s.t.
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig
• Γ, αx : T ⊢ Σα : 〈|αx|〉.〈〈L′〉〉P ≡ Σα : σ2.σ3 : sig.
– Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≡ σ2 : sig
– Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≡ σ3 : sig (notice that since αx : T, it follows that Fst(〈|τ |〉) = 1).
We have that:
• Γ ⊢ (|T|) ≡ σ1 : sig. From Lemma E.14, σ1 = 〈|T|〉. Thus, Fst(σ1) = T = Fst(〈|T|〉).
• Γ, αx : T ⊢ 〈|αx|〉 ≡ σ2 : sig. From Lemma E.11, σ2 = 〈|τ |〉 for some τ s.t. Γ, αx : T ⊢ αx ≡ τ : T. Thus,
Fst(σ2) = 1 = Fst(〈|αx|〉)
• Γ, αx : T, α : 1 ⊢ 〈〈L′〉〉P ≡ σ3 : sig. From IH, we have that Fst(〈〈L′〉〉P ) = Fst(σ3).
Therefore, from the definition of Fst(), we have that Fst(〈〈L〉〉P ) = Fst(σ)
Case 3: L = x :: L′, where FP (x) = f . The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2.
Case 4: L = x :: L′, where FP (x) = f ◦ a. The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2.
Lemma E.19. • For any Γ, if Γ ⊢ σ ≡ 〈|τ |〉 : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
• For any Γ, if Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≡ σ : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of the judgments. We only have the following cases, since other
rules are not applicable.
Case 1: eqs refl. The proof is trivial.
Case 2: eqs symm. The proofs of two parts are directly from IH.
Case 3: eqs trans. The proofs follows from IH and the fact that ≡ of types is transitivity.
Case 4: eqs dyn. The proofs follows from the rule.
Lemma E.20. • For any Γ, if Γ ⊢ σ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
• For any Γ, if Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ : sig, then σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove both parts of the lemma by induction on the derivation of Γ ⊢ σ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig and Γ ⊢ 〈|τ |〉 ≤ σ : sig. We
only have the following cases (other rules are not applicable).
Case 1: subs refl. The proof follows from Lemma E.19.
Case 2: subs trans.
• Part 1: from the rule, Γ ⊢ σ ≤ σ′′ : sig and Γ ⊢ σ′′ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From IH for Γ ⊢ σ′′ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig, σ′′ = 〈|τ ′′|〉 for some
τ ′′ s.t. Γ ⊢ τ ′′ ≡ τ ′ : T. Now, we can apply IH on Γ ⊢ σ ≤ 〈|τ ′′|〉 : sig and we have that σ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t.
Γ ⊢ τ ′ ≡ τ ′′ : T. Since ≡ for type is transitivity, we have that Γ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
• Part 2: the proof is similar.
Lemma E.21. If ⊢P wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σ
∗.〈|τ |〉, where ⊢ σ∗ ≡ σP : sig, then αP/mP : σ∗∗ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ
′|〉 for some σ∗∗ and
τ ′s.t. αP/mP : σ
∗∗ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ and ⊢ σ∗∗ ≡ σP .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of ⊢P wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σP .〈|τ |〉.
Case 1: ofm lamgn. From the rule, αP/mP : σ
∗ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ |〉.
Case 2: ofm subsume. From the rule, we have ⊢P wrapP (e) : Π
gnαP : σ.σ
′ s.t. ⊢ ΠgnαP : σ.σ′ ≤ ΠgnαP : σ∗.(|τ |) : sig.
From subs pigen, we have that ⊢ σ∗ ≤ σ : sig and αP : Fst(σ∗) ⊢ σ′ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig.
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• Since ⊢ σ∗ ≤ σ : sig and ⊢ σ∗ ≡ σP : sig, we have that ⊢ σP ≤ σ : sig. From Lemma E.17, we have that ⊢ σP ≡ σ : sig.
• Since αP : Fst(σ
∗) ⊢ σ′ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig, from Lemma E.20, we have that σ′ = 〈|τ ′|〉 for some τ ′.
Thus, we have that ⊢P wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σ.〈|τ ′|〉 s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig. From IH, we close this case.
Lemma E.22. If αP/mP : σ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ |〉 for some σ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig, then αP/mP : σ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ
′|〉 for some τ ′ s.t.
αP/mP : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of αP/mP : σ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ |〉. We only have the following case:
Case 1: ofm forget. The proof is directly from the rule.
Case 2: ofm subsume. From the rule, we have that αP/mP : σ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : σ
′ and αP/mP : σ ⊢ σ
′ ≤ 〈|τ |〉 : sig. From
Lemma E.20, we have that σ′ = 〈|τ ′′|〉 s.t. αP/mP : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. Thus, we can apply IH on αP/mP : σ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : σ
′ and
close this case.
Lemma E.23. If αP/mP : σ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ |〉 for some σ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig, then αP/mP : σ ⊢ e : τ
′ for some τ ′ s.t.
αP/mP : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the derivation of αP/mP : σ ⊢P 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ |〉. We have the following cases.
Case 1: ofm dyn. The proof is directly from the rule.
Case 2: ofm subsume. The proof is similar to the proof of Case 2 in Lemma E.22.
Lemma E.24. If ⊢ wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σP .〈|τ |〉, then αP/mP : σ ⊢ e : τ ′ for some σ and τ ′ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig and
αP/mP : σ ⊢ τ ≡ τ
′ : T.
Proof. Since ⊢ wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σP .〈|τ |〉, from Lemma E.21, we have that αP/mP : σ′′ ⊢I 〈|e|〉 : 〈|τ
′′|〉 for some σ′′ and τ ′′
s.t. ⊢ σ′′ ≡ σP : sig and αP/mP : σ′′ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′′ : T. From Lemma E.22 and Lemma E.23, we have that αP/mP : σ′ ⊢ e : τ ′
for some σ′ and τ ′ s.t. ⊢ σ′ ≡ σP : sig and αP/mP : σ′ ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T.
Theorem D.14 [§VII] If ⊢P wrapP(e) : Π
gnαP : σP .〈|τ |〉, then e is TRNI(P , τ).
Proof. From Lemma E.24, we have that αP/mP : σ ⊢ e : τ ′ for some σ and τ ′ s.t. ⊢ σ ≡ σP : sig and αP/mP : σ ⊢ τ ≡
τ ′ : T. From Lemma E.18, we have that Fst(σ) = Fst(σP). In addition, since module variables are not used in the judgments
Γ ⊢ c : k, we have that αP : Fst(σP ) ⊢ τ ≡ τ ′ : T. Thus, we have that αP/mP : σP ⊢ e : τ . From Theorem VII.1, e is
TRNI(P , τ).
APPENDIX F
REMARK AND ENCODING
a) Alternative definition for P .: An alternative way to define a local policy P is to define it as a total mapping from
confidential inputs to declassification functions and combinations. One may think that w.r.t. this definition, we cannot express
policies with inputs that cannot be declassified. In fact, we can expresses such policies: such a confidential input is mapped
to λx : int.n0 for some n0. The application of this function on a confidential value is always n0 and hence this function does
not reveal information about the confidential value.
b) Extension.: We consider a policy P where there are two confidential inputs x and y, x can be declassified via f ,
and y can be declassified via g, f : int→ τ , and g : int→ τ for some τ . Suppose that there exists an action a s.t. f ◦ a = g
semantically. With the encoding in Section V, we accept g y, or rather xg y, but we cannot accept xf (xa y) even though it is
semantically the same. To allow both, we have devised an encoding similar to the extension described above for policies with
multiple declassifiers, where y is viewed as a confidential input that can be declassified via g or f ◦ a.
To accept programs like xf (xa y), based on the idea of the first extension, we encode the policy as below, where y is
viewed as a confidential input that can be declassified via g or f ◦ a.
ΓPC = x : int, xf : int→ τ, y : int, yg : int→ τ, ya : int→ int
∆PP = αf , αg,f◦a
ΓPP = x :αf , xf :αf → τ, y :αg,f◦a, yg :αg,f◦a → τ, xa :αg,f◦a → αf
Indistinguishability for this policy is defined similarly to the one in Section V, except that we have the following rule for
αg,f◦a.
EQ-VAR6
⊢ v1 : int ⊢ v2 : int 〈g v1, g v2〉 ∈ IE [[τ ]]
〈v1, v2〉 ∈ IV [[αg,f◦a]]
As in the first extension, we can define TRNI for a type τ well-formed in ∆PP and we have the free theorem stating that if
ΓPC ⊢ e, and ∆
P
P ,Γ
P
P ⊢ e : τ , then e is TRNI(P , τ).
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W.r.t. the new encoding, both yg y and xf (xa y) are well-typed in the public view. In other words, we accepts both yg y
and xf (xa y).
Notice that as discussed in [12], the problem of establishing relations between declassification functions in general is
undecidable. Thus, the relations should be provided or can be found in a predefined amount of time. Otherwise, the relations
are not used in the encoding and programs like xf (ya y) will not typecheck.
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